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Ridicule is man’s most potent weapon.1 
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Being publicly shamed is, for some, a fate worse than death. This 
article addresses a tension at the heart of the practice of “popular 
public shaming” as a social regulatory mechanism. While shaming 
can be an effective and inexpensive tool to reflect and impart current 
collective values, it also can deter victims of wrongs from vindicating 
their rights in court, thereby inhibiting the pursuit of justice. Some 
legislatures and courts, including the United States Supreme Court, 
have sought to address this problem by permitting certain 
rightsholders to bring lawsuits pseudonymously. However, as this 
article shows, the standards and procedures in place for doing so are 
ad hoc, inefficient, and, ultimately, ineffective. Furthermore, current 
legislative opposition to plaintiffs’ use of pseudonyms, on the grounds 
that plaintiff anonymity undermines longstanding ideals of judicial 
openness, is misguided. As this article demonstrates, the normative 
and historical foundations of the concern for judicial openness in fact 
favor a limited option for plaintiffs to bring lawsuits without 
revealing their identities. When rightsholders demonstrate a 
likelihood of “public shaming” that reasonably will deter them from 
bringing a lawsuit, I propose that they should be presumptively 
permitted to proceed under a pseudonym. The burden then should 
shift to the defendant—and to the public—to show why the 
pseudonym should not be allowed. This article shows how adopting 
such a rule would address the risk that public shaming poses to 
access to justice, while simultaneously protecting the legitimate 
interests of defendants’ and society’s interest in monitoring the 




Imagine you are a guest in someone’s home. An accident occurs 
in which you fall and suffer a serious injury. As a result, you are 
required to have multiple expensive surgeries. As is common in 
cases such as this, you seek compensation from your host’s 
homeowner’s insurance policy. Doing so requires you to sue your 
host and name as a defendant—for pro forma purposes only—the 
specific individual who caused your fall. You file the routine suit in 
the local court in the Connecticut town where the incident took 
place. The catch? The named defendant in your lawsuit is your 
twelve-year-old nephew. In his exuberance to greet you at his eighth 
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birthday party, he jumped forcefully into your arms and caused you 
to fall and shatter your wrist. The media, which regularly scans 
court filings in search of “juicy” cases, finds out about your lawsuit 
and publicizes it. The story quickly goes viral, and you are vilified 
around the globe. Even journalists themselves weigh in, with one 
television reporter stating on the air that you should “use your good 
hand to wave goodbye to that family relationship.”2 
The above is the true story of Jennifer Connell, whose lawsuit3 
against her nephew made international headlines.4 It is an example 
of extrajudicial, or popular, public shaming5 directed at a plaintiff in 
a lawsuit. Connell was pilloried in the media and online. Trending 
hashtags on Twitter dubbed her the “worst aunt ever,” “the 
#auntfromhell,” and the most hated woman in America.6 The New 
                                                                                                                    
 
 2. Ree Hines, ‘Worst aunt ever’ speaks out: ‘I was never comfortable’ suing 
nephew, TODAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.today.com/parents/worst-aunt-ever-
speaks-out-i-was-never-comfortable-suing-t50351. 
 3. See generally Connell v. Minor Defendant, No. CV-13-6033608-S (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 2015). 
 4. See Matthew Murphy, Brekkie Wrap: Nephew of ‘world’s worst aunt’ who 
unsuccessfully sued him speaks out, NEWS.COM.AU (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.news. 
com.au/world/brekkie-wrap-nephew-of-worlds-worst-aunt-who-unsuccessfully-sued-
him-speaks-out/news-story/e11a8e1677ba865e240e109a42b2a223; Nephew of ‘world’s
 worst aunt’ defends her: ‘She loves us’, NEW ZEALAND HERALD (Oct. 16, 2015), http://
www.nzherald.co.nz/lifestyle/news/article.cfm?c_id=6&objectid=11530090; Schoolboy 
Sued by His Aunt for Breaking Her Wrist ‘Still Loves Her”, THEJOURNAL.IE (Oct. 15, 
2015), http://www.thejournal.ie/boy-sued-by-aunt-2391096-Oct2015; Darren Boyle, 
Nephew of ‘worst aunt ever’ who sued him for hugging her too hard and breaking her 
wrist speaks for the first time: ‘She would never do anything to hurt me’, DAILY MAIL 
(Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3272025/Jury-rejects-New-
York-aunt-s-127-000-bid-sue-nephew-breaking-wrist-welcoming-EIGHTH-
birthday.html; Darren Boyle, 'I love you...but you owe me $127,000': New York aunt 
sues nephew, 12, who broke her wrist at his eighth birthday party - because she can no 
longer hold a plate of hor d'oeuvres, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 13, 2015), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3270400/I-love-owe-127-000-New-York-aunt-
sues-nephew-12-broke-wrist-greeting-eighth-birthday-party.html. 
 5. When I use the terms “public shaming” or “popular public shaming” or any 
of their grammatical variations, I refer to disparagement, by ordinary members of 
society, the purpose of which is to embarrass, annoy, humiliate, threaten, intimidate, 
silence, or bring about any sort of degradation or diminution of an individual, group 
of individuals, or entity. 
 6. See, e.g., Jenna Greene, Aunt Who Sued Nephew Not Actually the Worst 
Person in the World, THE AMERICAN LAWYER (Oct. 14, 2015); Nicky Woolf, Insurance 
system may be to blame for aunt’s lawsuit against 12-year-old, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 
14, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/14/aunt-nephew-broken-
wrist-lawsuit-homeowners-insurance. 
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York Daily News labeled her “the Auntie Christ,”7 and the online 
comments around the world about the story were quick and mostly 
harsh.8 They included: 
 
 “AUNT JEN—Just replace the A with a C.”9 
 “I bet she is a burden on the company she works for, her 
coworkers hate her, and she’s had several failed 
marriages.”10 
 “I want her face on my toilet paper. We all know why.”11 
 “Maybe she’s a Manhattan escort and can’t give hand 
jibbers anymore.”12 
 “There is a special place in hell for her. I hope she rots.”13 
 “This woman is scum. Pure human garbage.”14 
 “She deserves to be publicly shamed.”15   
 
As a result of the public uproar, Connell appeared with her 
nephew on the Today show in an attempt to clear her name.16 She 
emphasized that naming her nephew as a defendant was a mere 
                                                                                                                    
 
 7. Chelsia R. Marcus & Corky Siemaszko, NYC aunt loses lawsuit against 12-
year old nephew over birthday hug that broke her wrist, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/boy-12-trial-conn 
breaking-aunt-wrist-article-1. 2395756. 
 8. Some posters espoused the idea that the lawsuit was indeed a legal 
technicality.  Stated one, “[m]ore likely . . . that there is a homeowners' insurance 
policy that has liability coverage that would apply to the aunt's medical bills, and the 
only way to collect against that insurance policy is to file a legal claim against the 
party who caused the injury.”  Another said, “[t]his is probably more to do with 
insurance companies . . . than it has to do anyone suing a child.” Woman sues 8 year 
old nephew for injuring her wrist during his birthday party, REDDIT, http://www.redd
it.com/r/news/comments/3ol3vl/woman_sues_8_year_old_nephew_for_injuring_her/#b
ottom-comments (last visited Sept. 6, 2017) (comment by TheDigitalRuler). 
 9. Reddit, Woman sues 8 year old nephew for injuring her wrist during his 
birthday party, REDDIT, http://www.reddit.com/r/news/comments/3ol3vl/woman_sues 
_8_year_old_nephew_for_injuring_her/#bottom-comments (last visited Sept. 6, 2017). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Darren Boyle, 'I love you...but you owe me $127,000': New York aunt sues 
nephew, 12, who broke her wrist at his eighth birthday party - because she can no 
longer hold a plate of hor d'oeuvres, DAILY MAIL (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www. 
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3270400/I-love-owe-127-000-New-York-aunt-sues-
nephew-12-broke-wrist-greeting-eighth-birthday-party.html#comments. 
 14. REDDIT, supra note 8 (comment by Cheerful_Pessimist).  
 15. Id. 
 16. Ree Hines, ‘Worst aunt ever’ speaks out: ‘I was never comfortable’ suing 
nephew, TODAY.COM (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.today.com/parents/worst-aunt-ever-
speaks-out-i-was-never-comfortable-suing-t50351. 
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legal formality.17 Her nephew insisted that “[Connell] would never 
do anything to hurt the family . . . She loves us.”18 
As recently observed in the New York Times: 
 
[l]awsuits involving well-known figures and sensitive issues 
have always drawn publicity, of course. But now that more 
courts are using electronic filing systems, judges and lawyers 
say they worry that the public is consuming lawsuits without 
any context. The most serious consequences: that some 
victims, fearing that the potential adverse aspects of online 
attention will outweigh the benefits, will decide not to file 
complaints at all. . . . In interviews, several plaintiffs’ 
lawyers said the current online environment was already 
deterring potential clients from filing suit.19  
 
The United States Supreme Court itself has acknowledged the 
threat to our legal system resulting from rightsholders wary of 
bringing their cases in light of the public ramifications of doing so.20 
In affirming a holding of the Washington Supreme Court, the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
 
The Supreme Court of Washington properly emphasized the 
importance of ensuring that potential litigants have 
unimpeded access to the courts: “[A]s the trial court rightly 
observed, rather than expose themselves to unwanted 
publicity, individuals may well forgo the pursuit of their just 
claims. The judicial system will thus have made the 
utilization of its remedies so onerous that the people will be 
reluctant or unwilling to use it, resulting in frustration of a 
right as valuable as that of speech itself.”21  
                                                                                                                    
 
 17. Id.  
 18. See Lisa Green, Nothing personal: Why Jennifer Connell sued her nephew — 
and why it was a lost cause, TODAY.COM (Oct. 16, 2015), http://www.today.com/ 
parents/nothing-personal-why-jennifer-connell-sued-her-nephew-why-it-t50686. 
 19. Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/lawsuits-lurid-details-draw-
an-online-crowd.html?_r=1.  Maryland law professor Leigh Goodmark noted that the 
online boom of gender-related court documents was a harbinger of a future in which 
virtually no legal document—an eviction notice, a divorce pleading with 
embarrassing details—would be safe from public consumption. “Things people never 
bargained on getting out will get out,” she said.  Id. 
 20. Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984). 
 21. Id. (quoting Rhinehart v. Seattle Times, 654 P.2d 673, 689 (Wash. 1982)).  
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Several lower courts have recognized the deterrent effect that 
failure to permit rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously can have 
on meritorious claims.22 Scholars have weighed in on the issue as 
well. Lior Strahilevitz has opined that “the nonavailability of 
pseudonymity may discourage some parties from bringing suits in 
the first place.”23 Daniel Solove stated simply, “[m]ore people should 
be allowed to sue without having their real names appear in the 
record.”24  
The justifications for the denial of plaintiff pseudonymity—most 
commonly a concern with judicial openness—do not recognize that 
the threat that modern technology presents to our judicial system is 
beyond the capacity of privacy law to remedy.25 Moreover, requests 
by rightsholders to proceed anonymously are greeted with 
antiquated court procedures that are ill-suited to responding to the 
impact of the internet and social media. Indeed, the internet has 
been growing exponentially—both in terms of technology and 
                                                                                                                    
 
 22. See Doe v. Oshrin, 299 F.R.D. 100, 104 (D.N.J. 2014) (“the Court finds that 
denying Plaintiff’s motion [to proceed pseudonymously] may inhibit Plaintiff’s 
willingness to pursue her claims”); D.M. v. Cty. of Berks, 929 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 
(E.D. Pa. 2013) (“disallowing anonymity would likely deter those [in these types of 
cases] . . . from vindicating their rights”); Doe v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 237 
F.R.D. 545, 550 (D.N.J. 2006) (“if this Court denies Plaintiff's motion, there exists 
the possibility that he might not pursue his claim due to the stigmatization that may 
result in his community and to his professional career”); Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. 
Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 467 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (“the public may have a strong interest 
in protecting the privacy of plaintiffs in controversial cases so that these plaintiffs 
are not discouraged from asserting their claims”); Doe v. Szul Jewelry, Inc., No. 
0604277, 2008 WL 2157893 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 13, 2008) (“[t]he only purpose 
revelation of plaintiff's name could have would be to further discomfit plaintiff and 
perhaps deter her from litigating the matter.”); Roe v. Providence Health Sys.-Or., 
No. 06-1680-HU, 2007 WL 1876520, at *4 (D. Or. June 26, 2007) (“the public has an 
interest in seeing this case decided on the merits. Jane Roe's allegations center on 
disability discrimination, an issue which carries important implications for disabled 
persons and for society as a whole. Should Jane Roe or her husband be mandated to 
provide their true identities, they may be deterred from continuing the lawsuit. 
Therefore, the public's interest in an open trial will not be impaired, and may 
actually be better served if plaintiffs' identities remain sealed.”). 
 23. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Pseudonymous Litigation, CHIC. L. & ECON. SERIES 
1247 (2010) (“[r]equiring Doe to forego her lawsuit [because she could not do] 
pseudonymously would have deprived her of meaningful relief and cost us a helpful 
clarification of precedent and statutory text”).  
 24. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND 
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 121 (2007),  http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/ 
viewcontent.cgi?article=2081&context=faculty_publications. 
 25. See, e.g,. Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs and Pseudonyms: The 
Anonymous Doe Plaintiff in the Information Age, 53 KAN. L. REV. 195, 197 (2004).  
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substance.26 Speeds have increased dramatically, and “smart 
phones” make the internet available during every moment of our 
lives.27 Access to court documents is often as simple as a click or a 
few keystrokes.28 Noted one journalist, “[l]awsuit papers are 
generally public, but before the advent of electronic filing, most of 
them remained stuffed inside folders and filing cabinets at 
courthouses.”29 In addition, social media has become a mainstay of 
everyday life. Studies show that over 60% of Americans obtain their 
news from social media,30 over two-thirds of which comes from 
Facebook.31 Perhaps the most concerning of all developments, 
however, is the use of the internet, by vast numbers of mostly 
anonymous “ordinary” people, to publicly shame those (almost 
always strangers) with whom the “shamer” disagrees.32 When this 
popular shaming is connected to plaintiffs in a lawsuit, its effects 
can be far-reaching and profound. The New York Times observed 
that:  
 
[i]ntimate, often painful allegations in lawsuits—intended for 
the scrutiny of judges and juries—are increasingly drawing 
in mass online audiences far from the courthouses where 
they are filed.  . . .[E]lectronic case databases, blogs and 
                                                                                                                    
 
 26. It is estimated that in 2004 there were 51,611,646 websites and 
910,060,180 users; in 2013, there were 672,985,183 websites and 2,756,198,420 
users. Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats. 
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). 
 27. For example, in 2002, it took twelve and a half minutes to download a song 
on a 56K modem; by 2012, a song could be downloaded in eighteen seconds. See Pam 
Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA, 
http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-years-
infographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016); see also John Aziz, Why is American Internet so 
Slow?, THE WEEK (March 5, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449919/why-
american-internet-slow. 
 28. Kantor, supra note 19. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See Jordan Crook, 62 Percent of U.S. adults get their news from social 
media, says report, TECHCRUNCH, (May 26, 2016), http://techcrunch.com 
/2016/05/26/most-people-get-their-news-from-social-media-says-report. 
 31. See Paul Fletcher, Two-Thirds Of Adults Get News From Social Media, 
FORBES (May 28, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulfletcher/2016/05/28/two-
thirds-of-adults-get-news-from-social-media/#159c2c2f2211; Joseph Lichterman, 
Nearly half of U.S. adults get news on Facebook, Pew says, NIEMAN LAB (May 26, 
2016), http://www.niemanlab.org/2016/05/pew-report-44-percent-of-u-s-adults-get-
news-on-facebook. 
 32. See JON RONSON, SO YOU’VE BEEN PUBLICLY SHAMED (2015).  
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social media propel a case into the spotlight even when the 
parties are not public figures.33  
 
Danielle Citron noted that a Google search can forever portray 
even a successful litigant as “the complainer, or the slut who 
allegedly slept with the boss.”34 The power of public shaming—
including the fear of being publicly shamed—should not be 
underestimated.35 Even Shakespeare penned in Othello “I have lost 
my reputation! I have lost the immortal part of myself and what 
remains is bestial.”36 
The time is ripe for legislatures and the judiciary to refocus their 
attitudes and practices toward pseudonymous plaintiffs. I propose 
that lawmakers directly acknowledge the impact that the threat of 
public shaming can have on rightsholders—a threat that affects not 
just individuals, but the entire legal system. It is essential in doing 
so that lawmakers and scholars alike recognize that permitting 
pseudonymous plaintiffs does not undermine, but rather supports, 
the values behind the ideals of judicial openness—whatever its 
meaning.37 
This article is the first to discuss popular public shaming in the 
context of its impact on a prospective or actual plaintiff. Much of 
today’s public shaming occurs online, so the focus of this paper, 
although not exclusively, is on online shaming. While several 
                                                                                                                    
 
 33. Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, 
(Feb. 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/23/us/lawsuits-lurid-details-draw-
an-online-crowd.html?_r=1. 
 34. Id. 
 35. The fear of being publically shamed is alive and well in the law professor 
community. In an email exchange that occurred on the CivPro list-serv, <CIV-
PRO@LISTSERV.ND.EDU, a professor wrote that she was “doing some consulting 
work on a piece of litigation that raises some very interesting procedural issues, and 
I am sharing them here to see what insights you might offer.” She then provided 
somewhat extensive details about the case upon which she had been asked to opine.  
One member of the list-serve responded “this is an issue that may not have come up 
before, but I view the purpose of this list to be facilitating each other's scholarly 
work. . . .  I think this kind of request may be a bit ultra vires,” while another stated 
“I am vaguely uncomfortable with using the list as a research tool for paid outside 
consulting work.”  These comments prompted the poster who had initially posed the 
query to respond “for the decade-plus that I have been a member of this listserv, I 
have repeatedly and continually shied away from sending any group-wide messages, 
precisely because I feared saying something inadvertently that would expose me to 
public ridicule.  Alas, the moment has arrived[.]” Postings of [names withheld] to 
CIV-PRO@LISTSERV.ND.EDU (May 18 and 19, 2016) (on file with author).  
 36. RONSON, supra note 32, at 143–44 (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 
OTHELLO act 2, sc. 3).  
 37. See discussion infra Part III B. 
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scholars have written about the damage that various forms of online 
shaming or “cyber harassment”38 can impose on individuals and 
society,39 my focus is on the intersection between the threat of being 
publicly shamed and potential litigation. Specifically, I suggest that 
when public shaming deters certain rightsholders from bringing 
litigation, or negatively affects those that already have initiated a 
lawsuit, there is a chilling effect that should be protected against. In 
other words, if the law provides for recovery for a plaintiff’s claim, 
the potential for being publicly shamed should have no part in 
deterring a rightsholder from bringing a lawsuit. This is particularly 
true with respect to individual rightsholders, as scholars have 
deemed individual plaintiffs “of vital importance to our legal 
system.”40 
I therefore propose that when a lawsuit is likely to be met with 
public shaming that reasonably would deter a rightsholder from 
proceeding, that the rightsholder be permitted to litigate 
pseudonymously. Unlike scholarship which proposes various means 
to punish cyber harassment when it occurs,41 my proposal is a 
prophylactic designed to prevent the deterrent effect public shaming 
can have on potential plaintiffs. Under the right circumstances, 
plaintiff pseudonymity could neutralize the dangers of public 
shaming, while maintaining society’s ability to access the judicial 
process, enable individual rightsholders to obtain justice, and 
maintain the law’s effectiveness in promoting desired social policy.      
In Part I of this article, I briefly examine the practice of public 
shaming. First, I consider the function of public shaming as a 
societal behavioral regulatory mechanism.  Next, I assess how public 
shaming has affected plaintiffs—both actual and potential—as 
reported in the popular press. I then analyze the judicial response, 
via case law, to the role that public shaming has played in the 
context of rightsholders seeking to proceed pseudonymously. I 
                                                                                                                    
 
 38. Danielle Citron has defined cyber harassment to be “threats of violence, 
privacy invasions, reputation-harming lies, calls for strangers to physically harm 
victims, and technological attacks.” DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN 
CYBERSPACE 3 (2014). 
 39. See, e.g., id. 
 40. Alex Stein & Gideon Parchomovsky, Empowering Individual Plaintiffs, 102 
CORNELL L. REV. 1319, 1325 (2017) (stating that “[l]awsuits by individual victims are 
unique in that they constitute the only litigation form that simultaneously advances 
the twin goal of deterring wrongdoers and compensating victims.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Derek Bambauer, Exposed, 98 MINN. L. REV. 2025 (2014) 
(regarding copyright violation); Danielle K. Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 61 (2009) (regarding civil rights violation); Mary A. Franks, Sexual Harassment 
2.0, 71 MD. L. REV. 655 (2012) (regarding sexual harassment). 
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conclude Part I by reviewing the powerful role that technology and 
social media currently plays in today’s popular-shaming-rich culture. 
In Part II, I present the current state of the law regarding 
plaintiff pseudonymity. I examine federal and state legislation and 
case law in this area. I highlight the varied, often ad hoc, methods 
courts currently use in evaluating rightsholders’ requests to litigate 
anonymously. I expose the substantive and procedural 
inconsistencies, often within the same jurisdiction, when plaintiff 
anonymity is at issue.   
Part III discusses the strongest impediment to the practice of 
plaintiff pseudonymity—the ideology of judicial openness.  I explain 
that most lawmakers assume that judicial openness refers to the 
notion that the judicial process not be carried out in secret, 
concluding therefore that plaintiff pseudonymity should not be 
permitted; however, the origin of the ideal of judicial openness is 
unclear. Thus, I explore scholarly disagreement about its meaning. I 
suggest that regardless of the historical definition of judicial 
openness, it is not necessarily lost when plaintiffs proceed using a 
pseudonym. I argue that paradoxically, our judicial system’s 
functionality is best preserved when certain rightsholders are 
permitted to bring their actions anonymously.   
In Part IV, I conclude with a recommendation that legislatures 
and courts incorporate concern for the potential deterrent threat of 
public shaming into their jurisprudence regarding pseudonymous 
plaintiffs. Specifically, I suggest that if a rightsholder can show that 
public shaming will be a likely result of bringing a lawsuit, and that 
threat reasonably will deter the rightsholder from proceeding, 
plaintiff pseudonymity be presumptively permitted. My proposal 
shifts the burden to an objecting party—and to the public—to show 
why the plaintiff should not be permitted to proceed 
pseudonymously. To support my proposal, I provide guidelines for 
the contents of a protective order that I suggest courts use in 
furtherance of the pseudonymous plaintiff process.   
My proposal encourages federal and state legislatures and courts 
to recognize the potential for popular public shaming inherent with 
modern technology and the extraordinary damage that shaming can 
inflict—both on rightsholders and the judicial system as a whole.  
With respect to cases where rightsholders are at risk of being 
deterred from bringing their claims out of fear of being publicly 
shamed, a change in the approach to, and procedure involved in, 
deciding whether they may proceed anonymously is imperative.   
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I.  PUBLIC SHAMING 
 
A.  Public Shaming as an Indicator and Regulator of Normative 
Values 
 
Scholars have long debated the benefits and drawbacks of public 
shaming as both a behavioral regulatory mechanism and a means of 
punishment for criminal behavior.42 Dan Kahan has stated that “it 
should be politically acceptable to punish a wide array of offenses 
with shaming alone.”43 Many opine that shaming can be low-cost, 
flexible, and sometimes more effective at regulating behavior than 
more traditional methods.44 Shaming also can level the playing field 
between Davids and Goliaths and give the shamer a sense of 
satisfaction that traditional regulatory means do not impart.45 
Shaming also provides an insight into collective normative values. 
Perhaps one of the most successful examples of public shaming 
as a barometer and enforcer of social norms occurred with the 2013 
broadcast of CNN’s documentary Blackfish.46 The film told the story 
of Tilikum, a 12,000 pound orca whale kept in captivity by SeaWorld 
and used in its popular shows.47 The documentary highlighted the 
dangers that trainers face while working with orcas, and revealed 
Tilikum’s role in the deaths of three handlers.48 CNN exposed the 
heartless methods used to capture orca whales from the wild and 
made the case that keeping these whales in captivity for 
entertainment purposes is cruel and inhumane.49 After the 
documentary aired, Consumerist branded SeaWorld as one of the 
                                                                                                                    
 
 42. See, e.g., Leah Griswald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 
625 (2011); Dan Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 2075 (2006); Elizabeth Rosenblatt, Fear and Loathing: Shame, Shaming, and 
Intellectual Property, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (2013); David Skeel Jr., Shaming in 
Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). The details of these complex and 
nuanced debates are beyond the scope of this article. 
 43. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 637 (1996). But see Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075 (2006) (stating that the author has “concluded 
that [he] was wrong” to defend shaming as an alternative sanction).  
 44. See Rosenblatt, supra note 42, at 31–32. 
 45. Id. at 32–33.  
 46. BLACKFISH (CNN Films 2013). 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id.  
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“Four Worst Companies in America.”50 Attendance dropped at 
SeaWorld theme parks, and various celebrities and corporations 
severed ties with the company.51 Its stock price plummeted,52 the 
chief executive resigned,53 and SeaWorld announced that it will 
officially end its orca breeding program—a decision labeled “a huge 
concession to critics and animal welfare groups.”54  
On the other hand, scholar Toni Massaro has concluded, 
“[w]e . . . cannot ignore the profound harm that effective shaming, 
where it can be achieved, may cause.”55 Indeed, some critics of 
shaming punishments argue that they are inhumane and 
degrading.56 Others call them “lynch justice,”57 which violate the 
offender’s “transactional dignity.”58   
To be sure, attention has been paid to those found guilty, 
shamed, and later exonerated, who then remain unable to escape the 
ignominy. My focus goes one step further, as my concern is with 
those who have done nothing wrong, but rather are innocent 
                                                                                                                    
 
 50. See Worst Company in America, WORDPRESS, http://consumermediallc.files. 
wordpress.com/2014/04/2014wciabracketqfinal.png (last visited Sept. 6, 2017). 
 51. See Jordan Zakarin, The Documentary “Blackfish” is Causing More Major 
Problems for SeaWorld, BUZZFEED (Jan. 3, 2014), http://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
jordanzakarin/the-documentary-blackfish-problems-for-seaworld?utm_term=. 
nrR1wWWYJ#.jbJMX00LP. See also Greg Allen, January 15, 2014, Months After 
'Blackfish' Release, Controversy Over SeaWorld Grows, NPR (Jan. 15, 2014), 
http://www.npr.org/2014/01/15/262767226/months-after-blackfish-release-
controversy-for-seaworld-grows; Melissa Cronin, SeaWorld Loses 1 Million Visitors 
As It Clings To Orca Captivity, THE DODO (Feb. 26, 2015), https://www.thedodo. 
com/seaworld-stock-quarter-four-1012275533.html; Hannah Samson, SeaWorld Is 
Still Tanking as Public Perception Problems Return, SKIFT (Aug. 8, 2017), 
https://skift.com/2017/08/08/seaworld-is-still-tanking-as-public-perception-problems-
return/. 
 52. Roberto Ferdman, Chart: What the documentary ‘Blackfish’ has done to 
SeaWorld, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonk/wp/2014/12/12/chart-what-the-documentary-blackfish-has-done-to-
seaworld/?utm_term=.9616e661cbef. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See Greg Allen, SeaWorld Agrees To End Captive Breeding Of Killer 
Whales, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/17/ 
470720804/seaworld-agrees-to-end-captive-breeding-of-killer-whales. 
 55. Toni Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. 
REV. 1880, 1943 (1991). 
 56. Lauren M. Goldman, Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites on 
Public Shaming Punishments, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 415, 432 (2014).  
 57. Id. at 436 (quoting James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame 
Sanctions? 107 YALE L.J. 1055, 1059 (1998)). 
 58. James Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions? 107 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1090 (1998). 
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rightsholders whose vulnerability to shaming impacts their ability to 
seek justice.   
Because collective ideals are included in the substantive law as a 
result of the legislative process, rightsholders should be free to 
pursue their rights under those ideals. Shaming should have no role 
in influencing whether certain rightsholders will pursue their 
actions. To be clear, shaming can still play an important function in 
demonstrating societal reaction to specific litigation. However, its 
part should be in the form of a response to an anonymous plaintiff’s 
lawsuit instead of as potential deterrent to a named plaintiff. That 
way the public would be free to express its views on lawsuits, 
thereby imparting normative societal values and potentially 
inspiring change, while simultaneously permitting rightsholders to 
vindicate their rights.  
 
B.  Public Shaming’s Deterrent Effect on Potential Plaintiffs 
 
In Privacy, Plaintiffs and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe 
Plaintiff in the Information Age,59 I suggested that reluctance to 
permit certain rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously would stifle 
the judicial process and force some rightsholders to choose to forgo 
their claims in the name of protecting their privacy.60 Recent events 
bear out my hypothesis. For example, in 2015, hackers known as 
“The Impact Team” broke into Ashley Madison, a website with over 
30 million users who are married—or otherwise in a committed 
relationship—seeking to have an affair.61 The hackers posted 
personal information online about many Ashley Madison users, who, 
as a result of the disclosure of their private information, then sued 
Avid Life Media, Ashley Madison’s parent company.62 Many of the 
purported plaintiffs sought to proceed as “John Doe,” concerned 
about the privacy violations that would ensue if their names were 
available to the public.63 Although psychologists opined that 
                                                                                                                    
 
 59. Ressler, supra note 25. 
 60. Id.  
 61. See Rory Bahadur, Individual Sovereignty, Freer Sex, and Diminished 
Privacy: How an Informed and Realistic Modern Sexual Morality Provides Salvation 
from Unjustified Shame, 8 ELON L. REV. 245, 274 (2016). 
 62. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 148 F. Supp. 3d 
1378 (J.P.M.L. 2015).  
 63. In re Ashley Madison Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., No. 2669, 2016 WL 
1366616, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 6, 2016) (“Forty-two Plaintiffs seeking to represent a 
class of users of the Ashley Madison website have filed under pseudonym ‘to reduce 
the risk of potentially catastrophic personal and professional consequences that 
could befall them and their families’ should they be publicly identified as someone 
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“[d]ealing with an affair in a very public way makes the 
embarrassment greater and the hurt for the  spouse and kids even 
more devastating,”64 the judge nonetheless denied the plaintiffs the 
ability to proceed under a pseudonym.65 As a result, several 
plaintiffs declined to proceed with the action.66 It was reported that 
at least one victim of the hacking and resulting publication of 
personal information committed suicide.67   
In 2014, harsh backlash on social media forced former Miami 
Dolphins’ quarterback Dan Marino to withdraw his participation as 
a plaintiff in a suit regarding concussions against the NFL.68 There 
was speculation regarding whether Marino would be employable by 
the Dolphins if he continued his involvement in the lawsuit.69 
Commentators were quick to point out that, unlike Marino, “Troy 
Aikman, Steve Young and Boomer Esiason have declined to join the 
thousands of plaintiffs in any concussion suit against the NFL while 
they have continued to work with various NFL broadcast 
partners.”70 Accordingly, Marino issued a statement, noting:  
 
I authorized a claim to be filed on my behalf . . . .  In so doing 
I did not realize I would be automatically listed as a plaintiff 
in a lawsuit against the NFL. I have made the decision it is 
not necessary for me to be part of . . . this lawsuit.71  
 
Plaintiffs’ lawyers are not immune from public vitriol for 
representing clients with unpopular claims. After the horrific 
                                                                                                                    
 
whose sensitive personal information, i.e., names, email addresses, credit card 
information, and sexual preferences and habits, was contained in Avid's ‘cheating 
website’ database.”).  
 64. Carolyn Gregoire, Ashley Madison Hack Could Have a Devastating 
Psychological Fallout, HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 20, 2015, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ashley-madison-hack-psychological-fallout_us_ 
55d4afcee4b07addcb44f5d4. 
 65. In re Ashley Madison, 2016 WL 1366616, at *1. 
 66. Id.  
 67. Dominique Mosbergen, Pastor Outed In Ashley Madison Hack Commits 
Suicide, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
pastor-ashley-madison-suicide_us_55efe1dbe4b03784e2771e5d. 
 68. Armando Salguero, Miami Dolphins legend Dan Marino withdraws name 
from concussion lawsuit, MIAMI HERALD (June 3, 2014), http://www.miamiherald. 
com/sports/nfl/miami-dolphins/article1965425.html. 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Peter King, Dan Marino: ‘I Am Withdrawing as a Plaintiff Effective 
Immediately,’ SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (June 3, 2014), http://mmqb.si.com/2014/06/03/ 
dan-marino-nfl-concussion-lawsuit-statement. 
2017]  #WORSTPLAINTIFFEVER 793 
 
shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut, a lawyer sued the Connecticut Department of 
Education on behalf of a Sandy Hook Elementary School first-grader 
who suffered emotional trauma from the ordeal.72 The internet and 
mass media responded to the lawsuit “with outrage—calling it 
‘completely inappropriate’ and ‘wrong on every level.’”73 As a result, 
the lawyer withdrew the case.74  
 
C.  Public Shaming of Named Plaintiffs 
 
In other cases, plaintiffs who sued using their real names were 
met with public scorn, threats, and ridicule. Abigail Fisher, a white 
student who was denied admission to the University of Texas, sued 
the school in 2008.75 She claimed that UT’s decision on her 
application was a violation of the Equal Protection clause, since, 
according to Fisher, the school admitted minority students with 
qualifications lower than hers.76 The Twittersphere exploded with 
supporters of UT’s position, and the hashtag #StayMadAbby was 
created.77 People from all walks of life used the hashtag to publicly 
express disdain for Fisher and her lawsuit.78 After Fisher lost before 
the United States Supreme Court,79 a new hashtag was born: 
#BeckywiththeBadGrades.80   
In 2011, an atheist high school student, Jessica Ahlquist, sued 
the City of Cranston, Rhode Island, seeking removal of a large 
prayer mural posted on the wall of her high school’s auditorium.81 
After she filed the lawsuit, Ahlquist was “subject to frequent 
taunting and threats at school, as well as a virtual on-line hate 
                                                                                                                    
 
 72. Chelsea Kelly, Mass Shooting Lawsuits Can Serve Purpose, HARTFORD 
COURANT (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.courant.com/opinion/hc-op-fresh-talk-kelly-
mass-shooting-lawsuits-usef-20140204-story.html. 
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. Fisher v. Texas, 556 F. Supp. 2d 603 (W.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d Fisher v. Univ. 
of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Robert Bernstein, U. of Texas Supreme Court Fight Gets Hashtag: 
#StayMadAbby, USA TODAY (Dec. 13, 2015), http://college.usatoday.com/2015/12/13/ 
u-of-texas-supreme-court-fight-gets-hashtag-staymadabby. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 80. Alfred Ng, Abigail Fisher is now Becky with the Bad Grades, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS (June 23, 2016), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/abigail-fisher-
becky-bad-grades-article-1.2685865. 
 81. See Ahlquist v. Cranston, 840 F. Supp. 2d 507 (D.R.I. 2012). 
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campaign via Facebook.”82 She received death threats, many on 
Twitter, and required police escorts to and from classes.83 Some of 
the hateful social media comments included:  
 
 “everyone’s harassing her but who’s she going to report it 
to? [The school?] The administrators probably hate her.”84 
 “I’m sabotaging her site on Facebook. Let’s just say it’s 
going to be nuts.”85  
 “Jessica Ahlquist, your home address posted [sic] online.  
I can’t wait to hear about you getting curb-stomped, you 
fucking worthless cunt.”86  
 “But for real, somebody should jump the girl. LMAO—
let’s do it.” “I’ve decided I’m going to eat her family.”87 
 
Finally, on a popular radio show, a state representative from 
Ahlquist’s town called her “an evil little thing.”88  Ahlquist was 
forced to take time off from school.89   
While this paper’s focus is on individual rightsholders, it is worth 
noting that corporate rightsholders have not been spared from being 
publicly shamed for bringing unpopular lawsuits. In 2015, a 
customer in Texas wrote a negative Yelp review about Prestigious 
Pets, a pet-sitting company located in Dallas.90 The reviewer claimed 
that the pet sitter the company provided “potentially harmed” her 
                                                                                                                    
 
 82. Id. at 516. 
 83. See Abby Goodnough, Student Faces Town’s Wrath in Protest Against a 
Prayer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/us/rhode-
island-city-enraged-over-school-prayer-lawsuit.html?_r=0; see also Elisabeth 
Harrison, R.I. Student Draws Ire Over School Prayer Challenge, NPR (Feb. 7, 2012), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/02/14/146538958/rhode-island-district-weighs-students-
prayer-lawsuit; Christina Ng, Rhode Island Teen’s Battle Against Prayer Banner Has 
Gone ‘Too Far,’ Mayor Says, ABC NEWS (Jan. 18, 2012), http://abcnews.go. 
com/US/rhode-island-teens-battle-prayer-banner-mayor/story?id=15386786.  
 84. HyperHam, Love the Sinner, Hate the Sin, FAMILY V2.1 (Feb. 23, 2012, 5:54 
AM), http://www.geekfamily.co.uk/tag/religion.  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id.  
 88. Goodnough, supra note 83. 
 89. See Ileana Llorens, Jessica Ahlquist, Atheist, Receives Threats Over Prayer 
Banner Ruling; School Board May Appeal, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/27/jessica-ahlquist-prayer-banner-
rhode-island-school_n_1237199.html.  
 90. Paul Alan Levy, Texas Court Strikes Down Prestigious Pets’ 
Nondisparagement Clause Lawsuit, PUB. CITIZEN: CONSUMER LAW & POL’Y BLOG 
(Aug. 30, 2016), http://pubcit.typepad.com/clpblog/2016/08/texas-court-strikes-down-
prestigious-pets-nondisparagement-clause-lawsuit.html#more.  
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fish by overfeeding it while she and her husband were away on 
vacation.91 Prestigious Pets sued the customer in small claims court, 
alleging that her Yelp post violated a non-disparagement clause in 
their contract.92 After a Dallas journalist reported on the story, it:  
 
[W]ent viral, because the fact that a pet-sitting company 
would not only have a non-disparagement clause but would 
go so far as to sue its customers for mild criticism touched a 
nerve. Criticism rained down on the company for its lawsuit, 
and, according to the company’s affidavits, its new business 
fell off sharply.93   
 
Some of the web comments to CBS’s online story included: 
 
 “What spiteful business owners - not sure why anyone 
would ever use them. I know I never would.”94 
  “By suing these folks Prestigious Pets is itself providing 
even more bad advertising that some of its clients think it 
does a poor job. Never heard of them before but because 
of this I’d be wary of hiring them. And who would want to 
drop off a pet with Prestigious Pets (yet more advertising) 
knowing that it sues its clients? Dumb move!”95 
 
Even Yelp itself has weighed in on the controversy.96  When 
searching for reviews of Prestigious Pets of Dallas on Yelp, a 
disclaimer appears, which states the following: 
 
Consumer Alert: Questionable Legal Threats 
This business may be trying to abuse the legal system in an 
effort to stifle free speech, including issuing questionable 
                                                                                                                    
 
 91. Id.  
 92. Id. (citing McWhorter v. Duchouquette, No. DC-16-03561, 2016 WL 
3157322 (Tex. Dist. Mar. 28, 2016)).  
 93. Levy, supra note 90; See Pet sitting business bites back after getting bad 
Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yelp-
negative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/.  
 94. Sewilliams4822, Comment to Pet sitting business bites back after getting 
bad Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/ 
news/yelp-negative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/. 
 95. Rational_1, Comment to Pet sitting business bites back after getting bad 
Yelp review, CBS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2016, 8:11 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/yelp-
negative-online-review-texas-couple-sued-jeremy-stoppelman/.  
 96. See Prestigious Pets, YELP, https://www.yelp.com/biz/ 
prestigious-pets-dallas?osq=prestigious+pets+of+dallas (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
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legal threats against reviewers. As a reminder, reviewers 
who share their experiences have a First Amendment right to 
express their opinions on Yelp.97 
 
While the plaintiff, in this case, is certainly unsympathetic, it 
should nonetheless have the right to pursue its action without the 
threat of being shamed out of business. The judicial system can and 
should be the arena in which the enforceability of such a non-
disparagement clause is determined.    
 
D.  Judicial Response to Public Shaming of Plaintiffs 
 
In Doe v. Jackson City School District, a group of citizens sued a 
local school district for displaying a portrait of Jesus in a local 
middle school.98 The plaintiffs moved for permission to proceed 
anonymously, emphasizing the “bombardment of internet-based 
speech against [them]”99 and that “[s]ocial media sites appear to be 
the hotbed of this threatening and harassing activity.”100 On 
Facebook, users had made threats of physical violence and even 
veiled threats of using guns to commit acts of physical violence.101 
Some of the Facebook posts included: 
 
 “Hunt down whoever complained and get them.”102 
 “if they remove the picture I think it might get a little 
ugly in this small town & [sic] it will turn so quickly they 
won’t have a chance 2 [sic] get away! I can’t stand people 
like this.”103 
 “Find out who complained about it and settle this out in 
the parking lot.”104 
 “But, alas, I believe in freedom of speech unconditionally 
unless it lessons [sic] or severs my Liberties and 
Freedoms . . . in which case I must invoke my 2nd 
                                                                                                                    
 
 97. Id.  
 98. Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL 452918, at*1 (S.D. 
Ohio Feb. 7, 2013). 
 99. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Using 
Pseudonyms at 7–8, Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL 
9123171 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2013). 
 100. Jackson City Sch. Dist., 2013 WL 9123171, at 8.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Id.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
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Ammendment [sic] Rights upon you and your unjust 
endeavors.”105 
 
Some suggested that the plaintiffs should kill themselves while 
others wished eternal damnation upon them.106 More resorted to 
insults and name calling, characterizing the plaintiffs as Satan 
worshippers.107 Others suggested that whoever the plaintiffs were 
that opposed the hanging of the picture of Jesus should leave the 
country or find another school.108 The court agreed that the social 
media activity in the case gave the plaintiffs good reason to fear 
social ostracism, harassment, intimidation, and violence, and 
granted the plaintiffs’ motion allowing them to proceed 
anonymously.109  
In contrast, in Doe v. Kamehameha Schools,110 the plaintiffs were 
four students who sued certain Hawaiian private schools and their 
trustees for their allegedly race-based admissions policy which 
granted admission to any applicant with any amount of Native 
Hawaiian blood before admitting other applicants.111 In fact, the 
                                                                                                                    
 
 105. Id.  
 106. One commenter wrote: “It’s about time someone stood up and told the anti-
Christ nut cases to take a flying leap off a tall building!” Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed Using Pseudonyms at 9, Jackson City Sch. 
Dist., 2013 WL 9123171. Another commenter wrote, “To those who want it down, 
when you die I hope God sends you ‘down’. You wacko, sicko liberals are denying 
others their constitutional rights! Go find a deserted island and start a Liberal 
Colony. You are as much wanted in GOD’S COUNTRY as the lepers!” Id. at 10. 
 107. A commenter stated, “What a shame, This group That wants It taken Down 
is Of Satan.” Id. at 9.  
 108. A commenter wrote, “I am not even a huge Christian and believe the 
complainer and this so called 19,000 member cult are Fucking crazy.  If they don’t 
like it, go to school somewhere else.”  Id. Another commenter wrote: “No one told you 
that you had to look at it. If you have a problem with it then don’t go into the middle 
school.” Id. Another posted: “Pardon my French, but these assholes need to get away 
from our schools PERIOD . . . get the hell out of our states, our region and our 
schools.”  Id. 
 109. Doe v. Jackson City Sch. Dist., No. 2:13-cv-112, 2013 WL 452918 (S.D. Ohio 
Feb. 7, 2013). 
 110. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. Haw. 2010). For a brief 
review of this case, see Julie Hilden, Should Juvenile Plaintiffs Who Fear Reprisals 
Be Able to Keep Their Identities Secret? The Question Divides the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, FINDLAW (November 23, 2010), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hilden/20101123.html.   
 111. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1038.   
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schools only had admitted two students of non-Hawaiian descent 
from 1966–2002.112   
After news broke in local newspapers that the magistrate judge 
denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed anonymously, numerous 
vitriolic comments were posted to the newspapers’ online forums.113 
The plaintiffs moved to reargue the motion to proceed anonymously, 
citing a number of the threatening online comments as evidence that 
the plaintiffs reasonably feared retaliatory physical harm should 
their identities be made public.114 The comments included:   
 
 “Good that the judge ordered them to make these little 
brats [sic] names known to the public, so they can be 
tormented by their fellow students and general public.”115 
 The “4 kids . . . will need 10 bodyguards lol.”116 
 “Sacrifice them!!!!!!!!!”117 
 “Now stringing up those scum lawyers is not such a bad 
idea. (Don’t be scared, it’s in the Halloween spirit).”118  
 
One commenter noted that if the plaintiffs’ identities became 
known, they “would have to watch their backs for the rest of their 
lives!”119 Even the plaintiffs’ attorney received threatening emails.120 
The district court was not persuaded that either these comments or 
those presented in the initial motion provided reasonable grounds 
for the plaintiffs to fear retaliatory physical harm.121 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit emphasized that it was constrained by the “abuse of 
discretion standard of review” and stated, “were we permitted to 
                                                                                                                    
 
 112. Id. at 1039; See also David M. Forman, The Hawaiian Usage Exception to 
the Common Law: An Inoculation Against the Effects of Western Influence, 30 U. 
HAW. L. REV. 319, 331 (2008). 
 113. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1041.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. The sender of one email wrote: “You are a son of a bitch . . .I know so many 
kids that did not get into Kamehameha schools with Hawaiian blood and you are 
trying to take that away . . . I am tired of haoles [a Hawaiian pejorative for “white 
person”] like you. yOU JEWISH SHITHEAD!!!! if i see you ever in public.. no worries 
. . . I will SPIT on you … and YOU will throw the first punch . . . and believe me . . . it 
will be my pleasure to beat the crap out of you . . . by the way . . . i am a NON 
Hawaiian. . . .” Id. (emphasis added). 
 121. Doe v. Kamehameha Schs., No. 08–00359, 2009 WL 308351, at *6 (D. Haw. 
Feb. 6, 2009). 
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make findings and weigh the facts anew, we might have held that 
anonymity was appropriate.”122 With that caveat, the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the district court decision to deny the plaintiffs 
anonymity.123  
In a 2012 case, Doe v. Pittsylvania County, the plaintiff sued the 
County and the local Board of Supervisors challenging, as 
unconstitutional, the Board’s practice of opening meetings with a 
Christian prayer.124 Locals took to the internet to voice their 
displeasure.125 Some posted alarming and arguably threatening, 
comments in response to the litigation.126 One such post stated 
“people will do anything for money . . . just hope this person that was 
soooo offended is smart enough not to make himself known . . . it 
would not be a good thing I’m sure . . . just saying karma don’t know 
God either.”127 The district court, however, denied the plaintiff’s 
request to proceed anonymously, holding that the comments directed 
at the plaintiff did not specifically threaten violence and the ones 
that did were directed at the American Civil Liberties Union, the 
entity bringing the lawsuit on the plaintiff’s behalf.128 The court 
blithely noted that “[l]awsuits about religion frequently have a 
tendency to inflame unreasonably some individuals,” and “[w]hile it 
cannot be denied that the record, in this case, contains some 
indications of disapproval and frustration by some local citizens for 
bringing this suit . . . , this evidence does not establish the need for 
anonymity.”129  The Court found that lack of specific evidence of 
retaliatory physical harm militated against granting the plaintiff 
leave to proceed anonymously.130 
In the 2007 case of Doe v. Pleasant Valley School District, the 
plaintiffs, a group of adults who complained about a high school 
history teacher, alleged the teacher “showed his history class 
‘photographs of naked and dismembered’ women, made 
inappropriate sexual comments to students and provided a sexually 
explicit book to his class of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds.”131 The 
                                                                                                                    
 
 122. Kamehameha Schs., 596 F.3d at 1046.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp.2d 724, 727 (W.D. Va. 2012). 
 125. Id. at 736. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 737. 
 128. Id. at 735. 
 129. Id. at 738 (internal citations omitted). 
 130. Id. at 742. 
 131. Doe v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., No. 3:07cv854, 2007 WL 2234514, at *1 
(M.D. Pa. Aug. 1, 2007). 
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plaintiffs moved to proceed anonymously, arguing that exposing 
their identities would put them and their families at risk.132 The 
plaintiffs cited statements an unidentified student made on a blog, 
claiming that the plaintiffs “were not releasing their names because 
they know about a hundred people will go chase them down with 
torches and pitchforks as soon as their names come out.”133 The 
district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to proceed 
pseudonymously, reasoning that the statement was not “a direct 
threat to the plaintiffs or their family, but more likely idle chatter 
about public attitudes towards the plaintiffs’ claim.”134 The court 
instructed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint that stated 
their real names within ten days or else the court would dismiss the 
complaint.135  
Recently, the court in the Central District of California denied 
the plaintiff’s motion to proceed anonymously in the civil case 
involving accusations of rape by basketball star Derrick Rose.136 The 
judge reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to proceed anonymously 
“would communicate ‘a subliminal comment on the harm the alleged 
encounter with the defendant has caused the plaintiff.’”137 When the 
Washington Post published a story about the judge’s decision to deny 
the plaintiff anonymity,138 some of the online comments included:  
 
 “REAL Rape victims feel a strong sense of shame and 
need for privacy. Not the need to go on a world tour. The 
                                                                                                                    
 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at *3.  
 134. Id. See also, Publius v. Boyer-Vine, No. 1:16-CV-1152-LJO-SKO, 2017 WL 
1881463, at *2 (E.D. Cal. May 9, 2017) (stating “the reasonableness of [plaintiff’s] 
fear of physical and economic harm is not sufficient reason to grant him 
anonymity . . . [Plaintiff] has received ‘only a small number of even arguably 
threatening online comments, with no indication that anyone actually had the 
intention to carry them out.’”). 
 135. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2007 WL 2234514, at *4. 
 136. See Order Case 2:15-cv-07503-MWF-JC Document 264 Filed 09/22/16 Page 
4 of 6 Page ID #:9794; See also Joel Rubin, A rape lawsuit against NBA star Derrick 
Rose raises key question: Should an accuser be allowed to stay anonymous? L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-rose-rape-
lawsuit-anonymous-20161003-snap-story.html.  
 137. See Order Case 2:15-cv-07503-MWF-JC Document 264,  Page ID #:9794, 6 
(September 22, 2016) (quoting Doe v. Cabrera, 307 F.R.D. 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2014) 
(internal citation omitted). 
 138. Katie Mettler, Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose must reveal her 
name at civil trial, judge rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 21, 2016),  https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/21/derrick-rose-gang-rape-
accuser-must-reveal-her-name-at-upcoming-civil-trial-judge-rules/#comments. 
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rule was created to protect REAL VICTIMS, but as usual, 
there are those who will abuse it.”139  
 “Interesting: No criminal charges were filed, and the 
woman is suing them, yet wants to maintain her 
anonymity? I smell a greedy groupie who did not get what 
she thought she was gonna get for a night of partying and 
is seeking vengeance.”140  
 
E.  Public Shaming and Social Media 
 
Rapid technological advances are making the need for plaintiff 
pseudonymity even more compelling. Both computers and the 
internet are getting faster,141 so individuals are consuming more 
content than ever at unprecedented speeds.142 Additionally, the 
number of people using the internet and the amount of time they 
spend on it each day have increased dramatically.143 Young people, 
                                                                                                                    
 
 139. Scoeman Scoen, Comment to Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose must 
reveal her name at civil trial, judge rules, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2016, 1:50 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/09/21/derrick-rose-
gang-rape-accuser-must-reveal-her-name-at-upcoming-civil-trial-judge-
rules/#comments.   
 140. Realilty Check 2013, Comment to Gang-rape accuser of NBA’s Derrick Rose 




 141. For example, in 2002, it took twelve and a half minutes to download a song 
on a 56K modem; by 2012, a song could be downloaded in eighteen seconds. See Pam 
Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA, 
http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-years-
infographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016); see also John Aziz, Why is American Internet so 
Slow?, THE WEEK (March 5, 2014), http://theweek.com/articles/449919/why-
american-internet-slow. 
 142. See Eric Griffith, How Fast Is Your Internet Connection – Really?, 
PCMAG.COM, http://www.pcmag.com/speedtest (last updated Aug. 31, 2016).  
 143. In 2005, there were an estimated 1 billion internet users world-wide. In 
2010, that number rose to 2 billion, and in 2014, it rose to 3 billion. See Internet 
Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2017); see also H.O. Maycotte, A Gift for the World Wide Web on its 
25th Birthday: A Bill of Rights, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
homaycotte/2014/08/19/a-gift-for-the-world-wide-web-on-its-25th-birthday-a-bill-of-
rights/#733da95f31f8 (stating that “[i]n 2000, 5% of the world population used the 
World Wide Web.  [In 2014] that number [was] 40%, and rapidly growing as mobile 
technologies find their way to the more remote areas of the globe”). In 2002, the 
average internet user spent approximately forty-six (46) minutes per day on the 
internet. By 2012, this average increased to approximately four (4) hours per day.  
See Pam Dyer, How the Internet has Changed in the Last 10 Years, PAMORAMA, 
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including children, are particularly proficient in using technology 
and spend worrisome amounts of time “plugged-in” on the 
internet.144 Even the number of websites one can visit today is 
considerably greater than it was in 2004.145 Facebook, which was in 
its infancy in 2004, has grown to over 1 billion accounts.146   
These technological advances serve to heighten the concerns of 
rightsholders who want to remain anonymous. Via social media, 
information spreads faster than ever. Moreover, because Americans 
are increasingly abandoning traditional news sources in favor of 
getting their news from social media applications with push 
notifications like Twitter, consumers no longer have to seek out their 
news—it comes directly to them.147 Therefore, when a plaintiff files a 
                                                                                                                    
 
http://pamorama.net/2012/10/06/how-the-internet-has-changed-in-the-last-10-years-
infographic/ (last visted Oct. 1, 2016). For further statistical information pertaining 
to the dramatic growth of the internet, see Global Internet Population Grows an 
Average of Four Percent Year-Over-Year, NEILSEN-NETRATINGS (Feb. 20, 2003), 
http://nielsen-online.com/pr/pr_030220.pdf; SASI Group & Mark Newman, Internet 
Users 2002, WORLD MAPPER (2006), http://worldmapper.org/posters/worldmapper_ 
map336_ver5.pdf.  
 144. Teens spend almost 9 hours a day using media.  See Kelly Wallace, Teens 
spend a 'mind-boggling' 9 hours a day using media, report says, CNN (Nov. 3, 2015, 
9:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/11/03/health/teens-tweens-media-screen-use-
report/; see also Hayley Tsukayama, Teens spend nearly nine hours every day 
consuming media, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/news/the-switch/wp/2015/11/03/teens-spend-nearly-nine-hours-every-day-
consuming-media/. “Research by the Kaiser Family Foundation suggests that the 
average youth between the ages of eight and eighteen spends every permissible 
waking moment using electronic devices, many of which (like smart phones and 
computers) are connected to the Internet.” Jay P. Kesan, Carol M. Hayes, & Masooda 
N. Bashir, A Comprehensive Empirical Study of Data Privacy, Trust, and Consumer 
Autonomy, 91 IND. L.J. 267, 285 (2016). 
 145. It is estimated that in 2004 there were 51,611,646 websites and 
910,060,180 users; in 2013, there were 672,985,183 websites and 2,756,198,420 
users. Total Number of Websites, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats. 
com/total-number-of-websites/#trend (last visited Oct. 10, 2016). “It must be noted 
that around 75% of websites today are not active, but parked domains or similar.” Id. 
(citing How Many Active Sites Are There?, NETCRAFT (Oct. 10, 2014), 
http://www.netcraft.com/active-sites/). 
 146. See Facebook – Statistics and Facts, STATISTA,  https://www.statista.com/ 
statistics/264810/number-of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited 
Sept. 10, 2017). 
 147. See generally Paul Sawers, Breaking News For Android Now Delivers Alerts 
Based On Your Proximity To The Breaking News, THE NEXT WEB (Aug. 22, 2014), 
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2014/08/22/breaking-news-proximity-alerts-android/; The 
Personal News Cycle: How Americans Choose to get their News, THE AM. PRESS INST. 
(Mar. 17, 2014), https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-
research/personal-news-cycle/ (“Nearly half of Americans with internet access have 
signed up for news alerts.”); John Sutter, Theater Shooting Unfolds In Real Time On 
2017]  #WORSTPLAINTIFFEVER 803 
 
suit using her real name, that plaintiff’s identity and her claim can 
swiftly be revealed to millions of people. 
Conversely, under the veil of anonymity that posting on the 
internet provides, internet users are willing to say things that they 
otherwise would not.148 Additionally, due to groupthink—or “hive 
mind” in internet parlance—an insult a single commenter lobs can 
result in a never-ending cascade of threats, name-calling, ridicule, 
and vitriolic harassment.149 Danielle Citron noted that “the Internet 
magnifies the dangerousness of group behavior . . . . Online groups 
affirm each other’s negative views, which become even more extreme 
and destructive.”150 If the plaintiff has a social media account of her 
own with even the smallest amount of personal information, unease 
about harassment may become exponentially more visceral if a 
vindictive internet user retrieves and posts that information for 
others with similar disdain for the plaintiff. Concerns about 
harassment may transform into a reasonable fear of real-life, 
retaliatory physical violence.151 Thus, if denied the ability to pursue 
a legitimate claim pseudonymously, many rightsholders are forced to 
                                                                                                                    
 
Social Media, CNN (July 20, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/tech/social-
media/colorado-shooting-social-media/ (reporting that news of the Aurora, Colorado 
movie theatre shooting broke via first-hand accounts on Twitter, for example, before 
news outlets could even report the story).  
 148. See Cyberspace Complainers Counteract Stress And Command Power, U. OF 
ROCKIES (Oct. 25, 2011), http://rockies.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=15659&item 
=73653 (reporting on Dr. David C. Solly’s conclusion that “[w]e feel we are reaching 
more people when we use social media as a vehicle. . . . Complaining via social media 
gives the person a feeling of commanding great power and control over their 
situation.”). See also Joe Greenhill, From the Playground to Cyberspace: The history 
of Cyberbullying, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 4 (2011) (discussing internet anonymity and 
the exacerbation of bullying).  
 149. Tim Adams, How The Internet Created An Age of Rage, THE GUARDIAN 
(July 23, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2011/jul/24/internet-
anonymity-trolling-tim-adams (“The big problem [a Los Angeles Times reporter] 
finds running the blog is that his anonymous commenters get a kind of pack 
mentality. And the comments quickly become a one-note invective.”); MARY CROSS, 
BLOGGERATI, TWITTERATI: HOW BLOGS AND TWITTER ARE TRANSFORMING POPULAR 
CULTURE 62 (“critics of twitter point to the predominance of the hive mind in such 
social media, the kind of groupthink that submerges independent thinking in favor of 
conformity to the group, the collective.”). Recently, comedian Leslie Jones deleted her 
twitter account as a result of throngs of repulsive, hateful comments. See Kristen V. 
Brown, How a Racist, Sexist Hate Mob Forced Leslie Jones off Twitter, FUSION (July 
19, 2016, 12:52 PM), Fusion.net/story/327103/leslie-jones-twitter-racism/.  
 150. Citron, supra note 41 at 83 (citing Patricia Wallace, The Psychology of the 
Internet 79 (1999)).  
 151. See discussion of cases supra Part I. D.  
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assess whether vindicating their rights is worth suffering the public 
response that will result from doing so. 
Indeed, public shaming has become so powerful that it can, in a 
matter of seconds, ruin lives. Daniel Solove noted that “[a] plethora 
of websites now serve as forums for people to shame others.”152 Jon 
Ronson, author of So You’ve been Publicly Shamed, cautioned that 
“we are destroying people, routinely, daily . . . with the thing we are 
most terrified would happen to us.”153 “The great thing about social 
media was that it gave a voice to voiceless people. But we are now 
creating a surveillance society where the smartest way to survive is 
to go back to being voiceless.”154 Ronson observed, “[o]n Twitter we 
make our own decisions about who deserves obliteration.”155   
One example of the power of social media is the case of Justine 
Sacco.156 Sacco sent one short tweet, allegedly made in jest,157 that 
destroyed her life.158 In December 2013, Ms. Sacco was traveling by 
air from New York to Cape Town.159 During a layover in Heathrow, 
Ms. Sacco tweeted to her 170 followers: “Going to Africa. Hope I 
don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”160 By the time Ms. Sacco 
had boarded the plane in London, someone sent her tweet to a 
journalist at Gawker, who subsequently retweeted it to his 15,000 
followers.161 And then, before Sacco landed in Cape Town eleven 
                                                                                                                    
 
 152. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 86.  
 153. How social media led to a renaissance of public shaming, PBS NEWSHOUR 
(May 18, 2015, 6:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/social-media-led-
renaissance-public-shaming/  (last visited Oct. 17, 2016). 
 154. Jon Ronson, When online shaming spirals out of control, TED TALKS (July 
2015), https://www.ted.com/talks/jon_ronson_what_happens_when_online_shaming_ 
spirals_out_of_control/transcript?language=en.  
 155. RONSON, supra note 32, at 187.  
 156. Id. at 68.  
 157. Sacco said, “[O]nly an insane person would think that white people don’t get 
AIDS.  To me, it was so insane . . . I thought there was no way that anyone could 
possibly think it was a literal statement.” Id. at 68. “It was a joke about a dire 
situation . . . that we don’t pay attention to.” Id. at 73. Noted Ronson, “[i]t seemed 
obvious that her tweet, whilst not a great joke, wasn’t racist, but a reflexive comment 
on white privilege.” Id.   
 158. RONSON, supra note 32, at 68.    
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. “What the world didn’t know, is that she had been tweeting ‘little 
acerbic jokes’ to her Twitter followers about her holiday travels. One such tweet read 
“Weird German Dude [a fellow passenger on her airplane flight]: You’re in first class. 
It’s 2014 Get some deodorant. – Inner monolog as I inhale BO. Thank god for 
pharmaceuticals.” Id. Following that tweet, Sacco wrote about her layover in London 
“Chili—cucumber sandwiches—bad teeth. Back in London!” Id.   
 161. Id. at 78. 
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hours later,162 her tweet was “the number one world-wide trend on 
Twitter.”163 As a result of the tweet, Ms. Sacco was fired from her 
job.164 Her extended family in South Africa, strong supporters of the 
end of apartheid, told her that she “almost tarnished the family.”165 
Sacco went to live in Ethiopia after the scandal hit.166 Said Sacco, “I 
cried out my body weight.”167 According to Ronson, social media 
“annihilated” her.168 
Another well-known example of the power of social media 
involves the killing of Cecil the lion.169 In the summer of 2015, while 
on a hunting trip in Zimbabwe, American dentist Walter Palmer 
                                                                                                                    
 
 162. While Sacco was mid-air, her employer became aware of the tweet.  It 
responded with the statement: “This is an outrageous, offensive comment. Employee 
in question currently unreachable on an into [sic] flight.”  Soon, “[t]he hashtag 
‘#HasJustineLandedYet’ began trending worldwide as people were desperate to see 
how she would react to the thousands of angry tweets and the fact her job was now 
under threat.” See Lucy Waterlow, 'I lost my job, my reputation and I'm not able to 
date anymore': Former PR worker reveals how she destroyed her life one year after 
sending 'racist' tweet before trip to Africa, DAILY MAIL (Feb. 16, 2015, 5:49 PM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/Justine-Sacco-reveals-destroyed-
life-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html#ixzz4F0OBEopl.  
163. RONSON, supra note 32, at 69. See also Jon Ronson,  How One Stupid Tweet 
Blew Up Justine Sacco’s Life, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/02/15/magazine/how-one-stupid-tweet-ruined-justine-saccos-life.html?_r=0 
(“By the time Sacco had touched down, tens of thousands of angry tweets had been 
sent in response to her joke. [Sacco’s friend] meanwhile, frantically deleted her 
friend’s tweet and her account—Sacco didn’t want to look—but it was far too late. 
“Sorry @JustineSacco,” wrote one Twitter user, “your tweet lives on forever.”).  
 164. Will Heilpern, A writer who spent years following people whose lives were 
ruined by Twitter says online abuse is why the site is shrinking, BUSINESS INSIDER 
(April 20, 2016), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/Justine-Sacco-
reveals-destroyed-life-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html; Lucy Waterlow, 'I lost my job, my 
reputation and I'm not able to date anymore': Former PR worker reveals how she 
destroyed her life one year after sending 'racist' tweet before trip to Africa, DAILY 
MAIL (Feb. 16, 2015, 5:49 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2955322/ 
Justine-Sacco-reveals-destroyed-life-racist-tweet-trip-Africa.html#ixzz4F0OBEopl.  
 165. RONSON, supra note 32, at 77. 
 166. Ronson, supra note 163.  
 167. Dustin Rowles, What Happened To Justine Sacco, The Woman Whose Life 
Was Ruined By An AIDS Joke She Made on Twitter, UPROXX (Feb. 2, 2015), 
http://uproxx.com/webculture/what-happened-to-justine-sacco-the-woman-whose-life-
was-ruined-by-an-aids-joke-she-made-on-twitter/. 
 168. RONSON, supra note 32, at 276.  
 169. Author’s full disclosure: in the summer of 2015 when Walter Palmer shot 
Cecil the lion, I posted on my personal Facebook page a meme that had been 
circulating on social media.  The meme contained a picture of a trophy, a lion, and 
Palmer. The caption under the trophy read “trophy,” the caption under the lion read 
“king,” and the caption under Palmer read “asshole.” Jayne S. Ressler, FACEBOOK 
(July 28, 2015), https://www.facebook.com/jayne.ressler/posts/10207406452458327. 
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legally shot and killed Cecil the lion.170 After news of his kill became 
public, the internet went into a frenzy.171 Social media users from 
around the globe “called him a ‘scumbag’ and a ‘disgrace to 
humankind, and a detriment to our species as a whole.’ The address, 
website and phone number of his practice were plastered 
everywhere, with the practice’s website going down shortly 
thereafter.”172 Palmer’s private address and phone numbers were 
posted on Twitter.173 One British Twitter user tweeted, “I genuinely 
wouldn’t care if Walter Palmer was found by a lynch mob and strung 
up,”174 while a Canadian user posted, “Walt Palmer – Cecil the 
beloved lion’s murderer. Have at him.”175 
In August, 2015, Yelp chose to remove over 7,000 reviews on 
Walter Palmer’s dental practice page, stating that they violated 
Yelp’s “terms of service.”176  One such review had read, “[b]rought my 
lion here for dentistry and was horrified by the result. All kidding 
aside, I hope you die painfully.”177 Another said: 
 
I wasn’t sure if I was getting my tooth fixed or setting out on 
an African jungle safari—there were lion pelt chairs, lion 
heads hanging from the walls and elephant tusk umbrella 
stands. Inside his work space was even weirder—his chair 
(he informed me) was made out of the skin of a 1000 [sic] 
innocent baby seals he had so bravely clubbed to death.178  
                                                                                                                    
 
 170. See Cecil the lion: No Charges for Walter Palmer, says Zimbabwe, BBC 
NEWS (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34508269 (“Mr. Palmer 
broke no laws when he killed the lion using a bow and arrow.”). 
 171. See The hunting of Walter Palmer: Internet goes after ‘lion killer’ US dentist, 
RT QUESTION MORE (July 28, 2015), https://www.rt.com/usa/311002-dentist-lion-
internet-hunt/. 
 172. Id.   
 173. Id.  
 174. Adam Heath (@adamheath), TWITTER (July 28, 2015, 11:10 AM), 
https://twitter.com /adamheath/status/626062083512225792. 
 175. Diane Fraleigh (@Casey_Pup), (July 28, 2015, 9:56 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
Casey_Pup/status/626043544071835648. 
 176. Dale Lately, A One-Star Human Being, SLATE (Aug. 21, 2015), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/08/lion_killing_dentist_w
alter_palmer_s_yelp_page_and_the_business_of_internet.html. Ironically, Yelp itself 
was shamed for removing the posts.  A petition was created with the slogan, “Yelp: 
Post the Reviews!” Id. 
 177. harmoleon, 10 “Best” Yelp Reviews For That Dentist That Killed Cecil The 
Lion, BREAK, http://www.break.com/article/10-best-yelp-reviews-for-dentist-walter-
palmer-lion-2876455. 
 178. Id. 
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Indeed, there is currently a Facebook group page called “Arrest 
Walter James Palmer.” As of last check, there are 21,484 members of 
that Facebook group.179  
Recognizing the tremendous damaging power of the internet, the 
European Commission has proposed a regulation to give all 
European citizens the “right to be forgotten online.”180 The basic 
premise of the law is that it “will give all European Union citizens a 
right . . . for the individual user to have his or her personal online 
data removed from the web.”181 The Court of Justice of the European 
Union has already ruled in favor of a citizen’s right to be forgotten 
online, under a precursor to the current proposed regulation.182 That 
court ordered Google to remove links to newspaper articles about a 
Spanish citizen, which “although truthful, injured his reputation and 
invaded his privacy.”183  
Permitting certain rightsholders to proceed pseudonymously is 
especially important in the United States where there is no legal 
“right to be forgotten.” Indeed, Daniel Solove has dubbed the 
Internet “a cruel historian.”184 He observed: 
                                                                                                                    
 
 179. Arrest Walter James Palmer, FACEBOOK (last visited Aug. 18, 2017), 
https://www.facebook.com/saveafricanwildlife/. 
 180. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FACTSHEET ON THE ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” 
RULING (C-131/12), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/ 
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf; see also Patricia S. Abril & Jacqueline D. Lipton, 
The Right to be Forgotten: Who Decides what the World Forgets?, 103 KY. L.J. 363 
(2014-15); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 
(2012); Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be 
Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 352 (2015). 
The details of this law and the rights it implicates are beyond the scope of this paper.  
 181. Rustad supra note 180, at 353 (citing Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. 
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May 13, 2013), http://curia.europa. 
eu/juris/document/document.jsf? text=&docid=152065&doclang=EN). 
 182.  Id. at 363 n. 81.  
 183. Id. The plaintiff in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de 
Datos alleged that a Google search of his name generated a link to a newspaper 
article in which it was revealed that he had failed to pay debts many years earlier.  
Recently an Italian woman committed suicide after sexually explicit videos of her 
went viral on the internet.  See James Masters & Livia Borghese, Tiziana Canton’s 
family Calls for Justice after Suicide over Sex Tape, CNN (Sept. 16, 2016), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/16/europe/tiziana-cantone-sex-tape-suicide/index.html. 
Although she won the right to be forgotten online, and had even moved and changed 
her name, she was unable to escape the public shaming that resulted from the viral 
video. Id. See also Rachel Krishna, This Woman Killed Herself After Her Leaked Sex 
Tape Became A Meme, BUZZFEED (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.buzzfeed.com/ 
krishrach/this-woman-reportedly-killed-herself-after-an-explicit-
video?utm_term=.qhe3p1xpra#.lixa8z28wA. 
 184. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 11 (quoting a post on a blogger’s page regarding 
South Korea’s “internet-made famous” “dog-poop girl”). 
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One of the chief drawbacks of Internet shaming is the 
permanence of its effects. Internet shaming creates an 
indelible blemish on a person’s identity. Being shamed in 
cyberspace is akin to being marked for life. It’s similar to 
being forced to wear a digital scarlet letter or being branded 
or tattooed. People acquire permanent digital baggage. They 
are unable to escape their past, which is forever etched into 
Google’s memory.185 
 
II.   CURRENT STATE OF PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS 
 
A.  LEGISLATION ADDRESSING PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS 
 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide for the use of 
a pseudonym by a plaintiff.186 While many state statutes specifically 
provide for plaintiff anonymity in cases involving minors, sexual 
abuse, domestic relations, or sensitive medical issues,187 most state 
statutes mirror the federal rules, which require that “[t]he title of 
the complaint must name all the parties.”188   
Several states, however, have codified legislation directly 
addressing anonymous plaintiffs in a broader context. Alaska Rules 
of Court–Rules of Administration 40(b) provide: 
 
The presiding judge of a judicial district may direct the clerk 
of the court to substitute the pseudonym “Jane Doe” or “John 
Doe” or initials for a party’s true name on the public index if 
the presiding judge finds that the issues in the case involve 
matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature, that 
publication of the name could expose a person to harassment, 
injury, ridicule, or personal embarrassment, and that 
                                                                                                                    
 
 185. Id. at 94. A noted philosopher wrote that “[s]hame punishments . . . are 
ways of marking a person . . . with a degraded identity. . . . Shame punishments 
make the statement ‘[y]ou are a defective type of person.’” Id. at 95 (quoting MARTHA 
C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW 230, 235 
(2004)). 
 186. FED. R. CIV. P. 10; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(a) (permitting minors to 
proceed using their initials). 
 187. See Filing Pseudonymously By State, WITHOUTMYCONSENT.ORG, 
http://www.withoutmyconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/state. 
 188. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 10(a); see also FED. R. CIV. PRO. 17(a)(1) (“[a]n action 
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest”). For a compilation of 
state statutes’ filing requirements regarding parties’ names, see Filing 
Pseudonymously By State, WITHOUTMYCONSENT.ORG, http://www.without 
myconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/state. 
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protection of the party’s name outweighs the public’s interest 
in disclosure and any prejudice to the opposing party.189   
 
A provision of the Connecticut Civil Practice Rules states 
that: 
 
[p]seudonyms may be used in place of the name of a party or 
parties only with the prior approval of the judicial authority 
and only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is 
necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to 
override the public’s interest in knowing the name of the 
party or parties.190  
 
In Illinois, a provision in the Code of Civil Procedure states that 
“[u]pon application and for good cause shown the parties may appear 
under fictitious names.”191 A section of the Virginia Civil Practice 
Code, entitled “Anonymous plaintiff; motion for identification; 
factors to be considered by court” provides detailed procedures for a 
plaintiff to follow when seeking to proceed under a pseudonym.192   
                                                                                                                    
 
 189. ALASKA R. OF ADMIN. 40(b). 
 190. CONN. PRACTICE BOOK § 11–20A(h)(1). 
 191. ILL. CODE OF CIV. PRACTICE 735 ILCS 5/2–401(e). 
 192. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–15.1. The text provides: “A. In any legal proceeding 
commenced anonymously, any party may move for an order concerning the propriety 
of anonymous participation in the proceeding. The trial court may allow maintenance 
of the proceeding under a pseudonym if the anonymous litigant discharges the 
burden of showing special circumstances such that the need for anonymity outweighs 
the public's interest in knowing the party's identity and outweighs any prejudice to 
any other party. The court may consider whether the requested anonymity is 
intended merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation 
or is to preserve privacy in a sensitive and highly personal matter; whether 
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting 
party or to innocent nonparties; the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are 
sought to be protected; whether the action is against a governmental or private 
party; and the risk of unfairness to other parties if anonymity is maintained. B. If 
the court initially permits a party to proceed anonymously, the issue of the propriety 
of continued anonymous participation in the proceedings may be raised at any stage 
of the litigation when circumstances warrant a reconsideration of the issue. In all 
cases, all parties have the right to know the true identities of all other parties under 
such provisions of confidentiality as the court may deem appropriate. C. If the court 
orders that the anonymous litigant be identified, the pleadings and any relevant 
dockets shall be reformed to reflect the party's true name, and the identification 
shall be deemed to relate back to the date of filing of the proceeding by the 
anonymous party. D. In any legal proceeding in which a party is proceeding 
anonymously, the court shall enter appropriate orders to afford all parties the rights, 
procedures and discovery to which they are otherwise entitled.” 
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In one case from Arkansas, the state’s highest court urged the 
state legislature to consider legislation addressing pseudonymous 
plaintiffs.193 The Supreme Court of Arkansas noted that “appellants’ 
counsel urged this court to consider adopting rules to provide 
guidance on this issue in future litigation. We agree that some rules 
in this area are essential, and therefore, we refer this matter to the 
Civil Practice Committee.”194  
 
B.  Case Law Addressing Pseudonymous Plaintiffs 
 
1.  Federal Cases 
 
The legal landscape regarding pseudonymous plaintiffs has 
changed little, despite the explosive growth of modern technology 
and cyberspace.195 The United States Supreme Court has implicitly 
condoned the practice of pseudonymous plaintiffs in several cases, 
most recently in 2013.196 In most of these cases the Supreme Court 
did not address the plaintiff’s use of a pseudonym, simply permitting 
its use without reference. In other cases, the Supreme Court briefly 
                                                                                                                    
 
 193. See Doe v. Weiss, No. 09–1071, 2010 WL 1253216 (Ark. Apr. 1, 2010). 
 194. Id. at *3. 
 195. It is likely impossible to thoroughly research the prevalence of the use of 
anonymous plaintiffs, since the propriety of their use “is frequently resolved in oral 
or written orders that do not end up in published reporters or searchable legal 
databases like Westlaw or Lexis, making the precedent harder to find.” Tom Isler, 
White Paper: Anonymous Civil Litigants, RCFP.ORG, https://www.rcfp.org/browse-
media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-law-fall-2015/white-paper-
anonymous-civil-l#_ftn10. Additionally, courts often permit plaintiffs to use a 
pseudonym without analyzing the issue. See infra Part II.B. Furthermore, plaintiffs 
have used several different monikers, including Doe such as “Boe, Coe, Foe, Hoe, 
Koe, Loe, Moe, Noe, Poe, Soe, Voe, Woe, and Zoe. Some pseudonyms are descriptive 
(‘Pseudonym Taxpayer,’ ‘Patient A’), while others are more evocative (‘Jane 
Endangered,’ ‘Unwitting Victim’). Still others fail to announce their fiction: ‘Alfred 
Little,’ ‘David Becker.’ And then there are litigants who proceed only by their 
initials.” Tom Isler, White Paper: Anonymous Civil Litigants, RCFP.ORG, 
https://www.rcfp.org/browse-media-law-resources/news-media-law/news-media-and-
law-fall-2015/white-paper-anonymous-civil-l#_ftn10.  
 196. See, e.g., Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S.Ct. 2552 (2013); Doe v. 
Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77 (2004) 
(pseudonymous police officer’s challenge to termination of employment); Santa Fe 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (pseudonymous students’ challenge to 
public high school’s “football prayer policy”); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988) 
(pseudonymous student’s challenge to district’s policy of excluding disabled children 
from classroom for dangerous or disruptive conduct); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 
(1982) (pseudonymous children’s challenge to exclusion of illegal aliens from public 
schools); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (pseudonymous woman’s challenge to 
criminal abortion statute). 
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mentioned the plaintiff’s anonymity with a subtext of approval.197 
Although the Supreme Court has had occasion to rule on the 
propriety of, and standards for, the use of pseudonyms by plaintiffs, 
it has to date declined to do so.198   
The First, Third, Eighth, D.C., and Federal Circuits199 do not 
appear to have addressed the issue of plaintiff anonymity at all.200 
When analyzing whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed 
pseudonymously, the Fourth Circuit continues to rely on the five-
factor test articulated in James v. Jacobson in 1993,201 while the 
                                                                                                                    
 
 197. See, e.g., Santa Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 294 (2000) 
(noting with evident approval that the district court “permitted respondents (Does) 
to litigate anonymously to protect them from intimidation or harassment”); Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124 (1973) (“Despite the use of the pseudonym, no suggestion is 
made that Roe is a fictitious person.”). 
 198. See Doe v. Megless, 132 S. Ct. 1543 (2012) (denying petition for a writ of 
certiorari), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 5909906 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2011) (No. 11-643) 
(stating the question as “[w]hether this Court should provide much-needed guidance 
to lower courts by announcing specific factors that must be given special weight 
when a party wishes to litigate using a fictitious name?”); see also Doe v. 
Kamehameha Schools, 563 U.S. 988 (2011) (denying petition for writ of certiorari). 
 199. See Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 506 (M.D. Pa. 2007) 
(“[t]he Third Circuit of Appeals has not articulated a standard to weight litigants’ 
efforts to proceed anonymously”); Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8, (D.D.C. 2005) 
(“Whether a Judge may ever set aside the straightforward language of Federal Rule 
10(a) and Local Civil Rules 5(e)(1) and 11.1 to allow parties to proceed under 
pseudonyms remains an open question in this circuit”).  
 200. In one of the few cases since 2004 involving plaintiff pseudonymity in a 
district court within the First Circuit, the plaintiff had ingested a prescription drug 
that she claimed caused her to suffer a severe manic episode that resulted in her 
involuntary admission to a mental institution. Doe v. Solvay Pharmaceuticals, 350 F. 
Supp. 2d 257 (D. Me. 2004). The plaintiff filed a motion under seal to file 
pseudonymously. Id. The district court found it understandable that the plaintiff 
considered the information in this lawsuit “highly confidential, private and sensitive 
and does not wish the information as to her identity to be available to the public.” Id. 
at 274 n. 1. The district court even recited the facts in the case in such a way to avoid 
breaching the plaintiff’s privacy while providing an explanation for its decision to 
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant pharmaceutical company. Id. at 
257. 
 201. See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238–39 (4th Cir. 1993). In James, 
the Fourth Circuit held that district courts should consider the following when 
determining if a plaintiff will be granted the “rare dispensation” of proceeding 
anonymously: (1) whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely 
to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve 
privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personally nature; (2) whether 
identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the requesting 
party or even more critically, to innocent non-parties; (3) the ages of the persons 
whose privacy interests are sought to be protected; (4) whether the action is against 
a governmental or private party; and, relatedly, (5) the risk of unfairness to the 
opposing party from allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously. Id. 
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anonymous plaintiffs standards set forth in 1981 in Doe v. Stegall 
remain in place in the Fifth Circuit.202 In evaluating the plaintiff’s 
request to proceed anonymously in Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. 
Marsh, the Sixth Circuit in 2005 relied on the four-part test 
enunciated the year before in Doe v. Porter.203 Also in 2005 the 
Seventh Circuit, in Doe v. Elmbrook School District, relied on 
guidance regarding this issue set forth in 2004’s Doe v. City of 
Chicago.204 When evaluating potential anonymous plaintiffs, the 
Ninth Circuit continues to adhere to the standards set forth in 2000 
in Does I Thru XXII v. Advanced Textile Corp.205 The Tenth Circuit 
follows a three-factor test from 2000.206  
Furthermore, there is no indication that these circuit court 
standards are routinely followed by lower federal courts. Indeed, 
various lower federal courts have devised and examined a myriad of 
factors in determining whether to permit a plaintiff to proceed 
pseudonymously.207 As one federal court diplomatically put it, “[a] 
                                                                                                                    
 
 202. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981). 
 203. Citizens for a Strong Ohio v. Marsh, 123 Fed. App’x 630, 636 (6th Cir. 2005) 
(“When determining whether such an exception is justified, a court may consider, 
among others, the following factors: (1) whether the plaintiffs seeking anonymity are 
suing to challenge governmental activity; (2) whether prosecution of the suit will 
compel the plaintiffs to disclose information of the utmost intimacy; (3) whether the 
litigation compels plaintiffs to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby 
risking criminal prosecution; and (4) whether the plaintiffs are children.  It is also 
relevant to consider whether the defendants are being forced to proceed with 
insufficient information to present their arguments against the plaintiff's case”) 
(citing Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560–61 (6th Cir. 2004)). 
 204. Doe 3 v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[t]he 
presumption that parties’ identities are public information, and the possible 
prejudice to the opposing party from concealment, can be rebutted by showing that 
the harm to the [party requesting anonymity] . . . exceeds the likely harm from 
concealment”) (citing Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2004)).  
 205. See Doe v. Ayers, 789 F.3d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 2015) (in determining whether 
to allow pseudonymity, “the Court must balance the following factors: (1) the severity 
of the threatened harm, (2) the reasonableness of the anonymous party's fears, (3) 
the anonymous party's vulnerability to such retaliation”) (citing Does I Thru XXIII v. 
Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 206. See, e.g., Raiser v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 182 Fed. 
App’x. 810, 811 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[I]n certain ‘exceptional circumstances’ the need for 
anonymity outweighs the presumption in favor of open court 
proceedings. Exceptional circumstances exist if the case involves matters of a highly 
sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the injury 
litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of [] identity.”) (citing 
Femedeer v. Haun, 227 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations omitted)). 
 207. These factors include, inter alia, (1) whether the litigation involves matters 
that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature or involve the utmost intimacy; (2) 
whether plaintiff identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to 
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review of the case law indicates that courts which have addressed 
this issue have formulated various standards, albeit dissimilar . . . to 
determine whether a party should be permitted to proceed in 
pseudonym.”208  
In addition to the lack of uniformity of these standards, there is 
a lack of predictability and consistency in their application, if at all, 
within the same circuit. For example, in 2010, a plaintiff in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania moved to sue anonymously various 
public officials and local government entities for disseminating email 
and flyers that allegedly characterized him as dangerous and 
potentially mentally unstable.209 The District Court noted that the 
Third Circuit “has not addressed the standard for granting 
anonymity.”210 Thus the court examined nine factors, primarily from 
prior Eastern District of Pennsylvania cases, in deciding whether to 
permit the plaintiff to proceed anonymously.211 In denying the 
                                                                                                                    
 
plaintiff or to innocent non-parties; (3) whether the injury litigated against would be 
incurred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity; (4) whether the 
plaintiff is particularly vulnerable to the possible harms of disclosure, particularly in 
light of her age; (5) whether the suit is challenging the actions of the government; (6) 
whether the defendant would be prejudiced by allowing the plaintiff to proceed 
anonymously; (7) whether the plaintiff's identity has thus far been kept confidential; 
(8) whether the public's interest in the litigation is furthered by requiring the 
plaintiff to disclose her identity; (9) whether, because of the purely legal nature of 
the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in 
knowing the plaintiff’s identity; (10) whether there are any alternative mechanisms 
for protecting the confidentiality of the plaintiff; (11) whether the plaintiff will refuse 
to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; (12) whether the plaintiff 
risks prosecution for admitting to engage in illegal activity; (13) whether and to what 
degree the plaintiff will suffer economic harm her identity is known.  See Sealed 
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted); see also Filing Pseudonymously Federal, WITHOUT 
MYCONSENT.ORG, http://withoutmyconsent.org/50state/filing-pseudonymously/ 
federal. 
 208. See generally Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins., 176 F.R.D. 464, 466 (E.D. 
Pa. 1997).  
 209. See generally Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 210. See generally Doe v. Megless, No. 10–1008, 2010 WL 3076246, at *2 n. 1 
(E.D. Pa. Aug. 5, 2010). 
 211. Id. (“A district court considers a number of non-exclusive factors when 
deciding whether to grant a party anonymity. Factors in favor of anonymity include: 
(1) the extent litigant has kept his identity confidential; (2) the reason for anonymity; 
(3) if there is public interest in favor of anonymity; (4) if the case is fact sensitive or 
purely of a legal nature; (5) whether the litigant will pursue his claim if he cannot 
proceed anonymously; and (6) if the party opposing anonymity has illegitimate 
ulterior motives. Factors against anonymity include: (1) the general level of public 
interest in the case; (2) if there is a higher level of public interest in the trial because 
of the subject matter involved or the public status of a litigant; and (3) if the party 
seeking anonymity has an ulterior motive.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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plaintiff’s motion, the court concluded that “[a]fter weighing the 
factors, . . . [the p]laintiff has not proven his private interest in 
anonymity outweighs the public’s interest in open judicial 
proceeding.”212  
On appeal, the Third Circuit explained that “[w]hile we have 
affirmed district courts’ decisions on motions to proceed 
anonymously, we have never set out a test for courts to apply . . . . 
Courts within our circuit have been balancing . . . competing 
interests for the last fifteen years without our guidance.”213 Noting 
that the district courts within the circuit had primarily applied the 
test set forth by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Doe v. 
Provident Life,214 the Court then formally endorsed it.215 After 
analyzing each factor, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
denial of the plaintiff’s motion to proceed pseudonymously.216 
Three years later, a plaintiff sued the New Jersey Department of 
Corrections in the District of New Jersey, alleging mistreatment at 
the hands of various correctional officers and inmates.217 The opinion 
addressing the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint starts simply 
with the phrase “Plaintiff, Chris Doe,” followed by a footnote that 
states, “[i]n the caption and his Complaint, Plaintiff is referred to by 
the fictional name of Chris Doe.”218 Despite the Third Circuit’s 
official endorsement of Provident’s nine-factor test to be used in 
determining whether a plaintiff may proceed under a pseudonym, 
the District of New Jersey permitted the case to go forward with the 
fictional name of the plaintiff as “Chris Doe,” simply ignoring the 
Third Circuit’s test. 
Likewise, in 2008, the Second Circuit “set forth the standard 
governing the use of pseudonyms in civil litigation in our 
Circuit”219—what was then an issue of first impression for that 
Court.220 The Second Circuit adopted the Ninth’s Circuit’s balancing 
test, weighing the plaintiff’s need for anonymity against both the 
prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing 
                                                                                                                    
 
 212. Id. at *5. 
 213. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408–09 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 214. Doe v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464 (E.D. Pa. 1997). 
 215. Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 410 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 216. Id. at 411. 
 217. Doe v. New Jersey Dep’t of Corr., No. CIV.A. 14-5284 FLW, 2015 WL 
3448233, at *1 (D.N.J. May 29, 2015). 
 218. Id.  
 219. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 189 (2d Cir. 2008).  
 220. Id. at 188.  
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the party’s identity.221 In so doing, the Court “noted with approval” 
ten enumerated factors “identified by our sister Circuits and the 
district courts in this Circuit,” while cautioning that the list is not 
exclusive.222 The Second Circuit vacated the lower court’s decision in 
that particular case, as the lower court “did not apply the correct 
legal standard to determine whether plaintiff’s application to 
proceed under a pseudonym” since it “did not balance plaintiff’s 
interest in proceeding anonymously against the interests of 
defendants and the public.”223 The Second Circuit instructed that “a 
district court is not required to list each of the factors or use any 
particular formulation as long as it is clear that the court balanced 
the interests at stake in reaching its conclusion.”224 Notwithstanding 
the Second Circuit’s mandate, district courts in the Eastern and 
Southern Districts of New York, as well as the District of 
Connecticut, recently permitted plaintiffs to proceed 
pseudonymously without even addressing the issue.225   
In addition to varied and inconsistent evaluative standards, the 
procedures regarding the process by which a plaintiff can proceed 
pseudonymously are ad hoc, at best. In the Ninth Circuit, for 
example, a plaintiff may file a suit under a pseudonym, and then file 
a cross-motion for leave to proceed under that pseudonym in 
response to a motion to dismiss.226 In the District of Columbia 
Circuit, rightsholders may ask the Chief Judge, ex parte, for leave to 
file a complaint omitting the plaintiff’s real name and full address.227 
Leave is generally granted if the rightsholder makes a colorable 
argument in support of the request.228 If the Chief Judge grants 
leave to file, the plaintiff may then file a pseudonymous complaint, 
and the case will be assigned to a judge just like any ordinary 
                                                                                                                    
 
 221. Id. at 189.  
 222. Id. at 189–90. 
 223. Id. at 191. 
 224. Id. at 193 n. 4 (emphasis added).  
 225. See e.g., Doe v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., No. 3:15-cv-00452, 2016 WL 
1257819 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 2016); Doe v. New York, 97 F. Supp. 3d 5 (E.D.N.Y. 
2015); Doe v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 3d 23 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); Doe v. Deer 
Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 226. Doe v. Amazon.com, Inc., NO. C11-1709MJP, 2011 WL 13073281 (W.D. 
Wash. Dec. 23, 2011). 
 227. See e.g., id.; Qualls v. Rumsfeld, 228 F.R.D. 8 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“[w]hether a 
Judge may ever set aside the straightforward language of Federal Rule 10(a) and 
Local Civil Rules 5(e)(1) and 11.1 to allow parties to proceed under pseudonyms 
remains an open question in this circuit”).  
 228. Qualls, 228 F.R.D. at 10. 
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case.229 The Chief Judge’s leave to file is given only “at this time” 
and does not guarantee that a plaintiff may proceed pseudonymously 
throughout the case; rather, the leave is an indication that the 
plaintiff’s request is not frivolous and gets the case moving quickly, 
leaving the issue open to full, adverse litigation at a later date.230   
 
2.  State Cases 
 
State case law concerning pseudonymous plaintiffs is 
wide-ranging. Many state courts defer for guidance on this matter to 
federal courts.231 Others permit plaintiffs to proceed 
pseudonymously without addressing the issue,232 or by simply noting 
that the plaintiff is using a pseudonym.233 Courts in certain states, 
such as California, explicitly permit the use of pseudonyms, with one 
even acknowledging the danger that the internet poses to certain 
plaintiffs.234 When state courts deny a plaintiff’s request to proceed 
using a pseudonym, they often cite the need for “open judicial 
proceedings.”235   
                                                                                                                    
 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id.; see generally Doe v. District of Columbia, 216 F.R.D. 5, 6 n.1 (D.D.C. 
2003) (“Plaintiffs are proceeding pseudonymously, per order of the court, Chief Judge 
Hogan”); Oah v. Tabor, No. 90-1023, 1991 WL 120087, at *1 n. 1 (D.D.C. June 18, 
1991). 
 231. See e.g., Doe v. Weiss, 2010 Ark. LEXIS 176, *3–5 (2010); Unwitting Victim 
v. C.S., 47 P.3d 392, 400–01 (Kan. 2002); Doe v. Burkland, 808 A.2d 1090, 1096–97 
(R.I. 2002); Doe v. Bruner, No. CA2011–07–013, 2012 WL 626202 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2012); Doe v. Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1208–09 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007); Doe 
v. Heitler, 26 P.3d 539, 541–42 (Colo. App. 2001); Doe v. Shady Grove Adventist 
Hosp., 598 A.2d 507, 513–14 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991); Doe v. Bodwin, 326 N.W.2d 
473, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Roe v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., No. CIV.A. 11-991-BLS1, 
2011 WL 2342737, at *1 (Mass. Super. May 19, 2011).  
 232. See e.g., Doe v. Haw, No. CV OC 0205441D, 2003 WL 21015134 (Idaho Feb. 
3, 2003); Doe v. Mo. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 280 S.W.3d 110) (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); Doe v. 
Medford Sch. Dist., 221 P.3d 787 (Or. Ct. App. 2009); Doe v. Walsh, 2007 WL 
2734289,  Civil Action No. 07– 2052A (Mass. Super. Sept. 20, 2007). 
 233. See e.g., Doe v. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services, 182 S.W.3d 107, 108 
(Ark. 2004) (“Jane Doe and Jane Roe are pseudonyms”); Doe v. Wyo. Valley Heath 
Care Sys., Inc., 987 A.2d 758, 761 n. 1 (Pa. Super Ct. 2009) (“Appellee uses the 
pseudonym ‘Jane Doe’ to protect her identity”); Doe v. Arpaio, 150 P.3d 1258, 1259 
n.1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (“[t]he trial court allowed plaintiff Jane Doe to proceed 
pseudonymously. We continue that usage”).  
 234. See Starbucks Corp. v. Superior Court, 86 Cal. Rprtr. 3d 482, 495 n.7 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2008) (“The judicial use of ‘Doe plaintiffs’ to protect legitimate privacy rights 
has gained wide currency, particularly given the rapidity and ubiquity of disclosures 
over the World Wide Web”). 
 235. See infra Part III B.; see also, e.g., A.A. v. Gramiccioni, 122 A.3d 353, 357–
58 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (“Absent a statute or court rule mandating 
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Even in states where a statute provides for broader plaintiff 
anonymity than the four usual categories (minors, sexual abuse, 
domestic relations, or sensitive medical issues),236 there is typically a 
dearth of cases in which courts have directly addressed the issue. 
For example, although the Illinois legislature passed 735 ILCS 5/2-
401(e) in 1987, which permits the parties to sue under a pseudonym 
for “good cause,”237 an appellate court in that state recently noted 
that “[t]here are very few Illinois cases addressing the question of 
good cause under section 2–401(e).”238  
Like the federal courts, many states are inconsistent and ad hoc 
with their practices concerning pseudonymous plaintiffs. For 
example, in Connecticut, the Superior Court recently permitted 
plaintiffs in two cases involving sexual abuse to proceed 
anonymously,239 while in another similar sexual abuse case the same 
court denied the plaintiff’s request to use a pseudonym.240  
                                                                                                                    
 
anonymity in court proceedings, a litigant must show good cause to proceed 
anonymously or by pseudonym . . . Once the litigant shows such compelling 
circumstances, the court must weigh the litigant's privacy interest against 
constitutional and public interest in open judicial proceedings”); Doe v. Archdiocese 
of Atlanta, 761 S.E.2d 864, 869–70 (Ga. App. 2014) (“a trial court may, in 
extraordinary cases, [permit a plaintiff to proceed using a pseudonym].  In so doing, 
the ultimate test is whether the plaintiff has a “substantial privacy right which 
outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in 
judicial proceedings.”) (citing Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir. 1992)); 
Bransten v. State, 969 N.Y.S.2d 402, 414–15 (Sup. Ct. 2013), aff'd, 985 N.Y.S.2d 60 
(2014) (“[T]he ‘use of a pseudonym must be reserved for cases in which the matter 
alleged implicates a privacy right so substantial as to outweigh the customary and 
constitutionally embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings’”) (citing 
McKinney's CPLR § 1024, Practice Commentaries, by Vincent C. Alexander) (citing 
“J. Doe No. 1” v. CBS Broadcasting Inc., 24 A.D.3d 215 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)).  
 236. See supra Part II B.  
 237. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-401 (2016). 
 238. Doe v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 19 N.E.3d 178, 192 (Ill. App. 2014); see also Doe v. 
Town of Plainfield, 860 N.E.2d 1204, 1206–07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“Although 
anonyms have appeared in Indiana state cases, there is no reported Indiana decision 
where the use of an anonym has been challenged. Hence, we have no specific criteria 
to apply”). 
 239. See Doe v. Firn, No. CV065001087S, 2006 WL 2847885, at *1 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 22, 2006); Doe v. Curtis, No. CV095028697, 2010 WL 936781, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 10, 2010). 
 240. Doe v. St. John, No. CV055000443S, 2006 WL 1149224 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Apr. 13, 2006). Compare Doe v. Martin, No. CV044001231, 2004 WL 2669274, at *1 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2004) (denying adult victim of sexual abuse the right to sue 
pseudonymously), with Doe v. McNamara, No. CV095022796S, 2009 WL 1334992, at 
*1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2009) (permitting adult victim of sexual abuse the right 
to sue pseudonymously). 
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III.  IMPEDIMENTS TO THE USE OF PSEUDONYMOUS PLAINTIFFS 
 
A.  Legislators’ and the Judiciary’s Lack of Understanding of 
Technology, the Internet, and Social Media. 
 
Many lawmakers are not well-versed in the workings of 
technology, the internet, and social media.  Supreme Court Justice 
Elena Kagan admitted that she and her fellow justices “have a way 
to go” to understand technology such as Facebook, Twitter and even 
email.241 She stated that “[t]he justices are not necessarily the most 
technologically sophisticated people . . . [t]he court hasn’t really 
‘gotten to’ email.”242  Justice Kagan revealed that “communication 
among the justices is the same as when she clerked for the late 
Thurgood Marshall in 1987: “Justice[s] write memos printed out on 
paper that looks like it came from the 19th century . . . . The memos 
are then walked around the building by someone called a ‘chambers 
aide.’”243 In 2011 Justice Roberts stated that he did not have a 
Facebook account, nor did any of his colleagues on the bench.244 
Justice Breyer, however, did have a Twitter account, which he said 
he did not know how to deactivate.245 Justice Breyer said “I wouldn’t 
want followers on the Tweeter [sic].”246    
While overseeing Roger Clemens’ trial in 2012, the United States 
District of Columbia judge in the case told a juror “I’m an old guy. I 
don’t know how Twitter works.”247 He then asked the juror to 
explain it to him.248 In September, 2015, a state judge in 
                                                                                                                    
 
 241. Michelle R. Smith, Justice Kagan Reveals That The Supreme Court Is 
Totally Technologically Challenged, BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Aug. 20, 2013, 6:43 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/justice-kagan-reveals-that-the-supreme-court-is-
totally-technologically-challenged-2013-8. 
 242. Id. Justice Kagan also stated that Facebook and Twitter “are a challenge 
for us.”  Will Oremus, Elena Kagan Admits Supreme Court Justices Haven’t Quite 
Figured Out Email Yet, SLATE.COM (Aug. 20 2013, 3:33 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2013/08/20/elena_kagan_supreme_court_justices_haven_t_gotten_
to_email_use_paper_memos.html. 
 243. Smith, supra, note 241. 
 244. Maryam K. Ansari, Justice Roberts Speaks at 4th Circuit Court of Appeals 
Conference, FINDLAW: 4TH CIRCUIT NEWS & INFORMATION BLOG (Jun. 30, 2011), 
http://blogs.findlaw.com/fourth_circuit/2011/06/justice-roberts-speaks-at-4th-circuit-
court-of-appeals-conference.html. 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Richard Dunham, Clemens Judge: ‘I Don’t Know How Twitter Works’, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE: BLOG (Apr. 17, 2012), http://blog.chron.com/clemens/2012/04/ 
technologically-challenged-clemens-judge-asks-juror-how-twitter-works. 
 248. Id.  
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Minneapolis caused a trial verdict to be vacated and a new trial 
ordered when he posted on Facebook details about a trial over which 
he was presiding.249 He wrote “I just love doing the stress of jury 
trials . . . . In a Felony trial now State prosecuting pimp. Cases are 
always difficult because the women (as in this case also) will not 
cooperate. We will see what the 12 citizens in the jury box will do.”250 
The Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards publicly reprimanded 
the judge for the post.251 The judge explained that although he had 
been on Facebook for two years, he was unaware of its privacy 
settings and did not realize that his post could be read beyond his 
friends and family.252   
In 2009, Michigan Congressman Pete Hoekstra tweeted that he 
“just landed in Bagdad,” information that was not supposed to be 
public.253  In 2011, Ohio Congressman William Batchelder had his 
twitter account hacked.  In response, the Congressman stated “Well, 
I won’t do any more of this … Twittering? We’ll avoid that at all cost. 
I didn’t know I had such a device.”254 One legal blogger opined that 
“[t]he biggest social medial issue is getting judges to understand 
social media.”255 
 
B.  A Misplaced Understanding of Open Judicial Proceedings. 
 
Courts have been reluctant to permit plaintiffs to sue under 
pseudonyms, stating that to do so hampers the societal interest in 
open judicial proceedings.256 They presume, often without 
explanation, that pseudonymous plaintiffs and open judicial 
proceedings are by definition mutually exclusive.257 These courts 
                                                                                                                    
 
 249. Associated Press, Senior Judge Reprimanded by Judicial Board for Posting 
about Cases on Facebook, STAR TRIBUNE (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.startribune. 
com/judge-reprimanded-for-facebook-posts-about-cases/352218191. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Faith Eischen, Politicians & Social Media: The Good, The Bad, The Ugly, 
INDEPENDENT VOTER PROJECT (Jun. 29, 2012), http://ivn.us/2012/06/29/politicians-
social-media-the-good-the-bad-the-ugly. 
 254. Id.  
 255. The Biggest Social Media Legal Issue is Getting Judges to Understand 
Social Media, SOMELAW THOUGHTS (May 8, 2012, 1:19 PM), 
https://somelaw.wordpress.com/2012/05/08/the-biggest-social-media-legal-issue-is-
getting-judges-to-understand-social-media. 
 256. See Isler, supra, note 195.  
 257. Id.  
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also implicitly assume that open judicial proceedings are a per se 
good, without exception or qualification.258   
However, there appears to be no agreement on what constitutes 
open judicial proceedings.259 Most courts have accepted, without 
investigation, the notion that open judicial proceedings refers to a 
prohibition against secrecy in the judicial process. The United States 
Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he operations of the courts and the 
judicial conduct of judges are matters of utmost public concern.”260 
That Court opined that open court proceedings assure that 
proceedings are conducted fairly and discourage perjury, misconduct 
by participants, and biased decision making.261 The Court 
proclaimed that openness promotes public understanding, 
confidence, and acceptance of judicial processes and results, while 
secrecy encourages misunderstanding, distrust, and disrespect for 
the courts.262 The importance of openness in judicial proceedings can 
be seen in several state constitutions, which include specific 
reference to such access.263 Opponents of plaintiff pseudonymity 
argue that the practice contravenes the importance of open judicial 
proceedings.264   
Although many state constitutions include a provision that “all 
courts shall be open,”265 much research on this provision indicates 
                                                                                                                    
 
 258. Id.  
 259. “[With respect to] the open courts clause[,] [t]he courts are in total disarray 
over how to interpret it.” Jonathan M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The 
Origins of the Open Courts Clause of State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1282 
(1995); see generally Thomas R. Phillips, The Constitutional Right to A Remedy, 78 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1309 (2003). 
 260. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).  
 261. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).  
 262. Id. at 569–70. 
 263. See e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 11 (“[j]ustice in all cases shall be 
administered openly”);  CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“the meetings of public bodies . . . 
shall be open to public scrutiny”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 10 (“[n]o court shall be secret, 
but justice shall be administered, openly and without purchase”); WASH. CONST. art. 
I, § 10 (“[j]ustice in all cases shall be administered openly, and without unnecessary 
delay”). For a comprehensive list of state constitutions’ open courts clauses, see 
Judicial Administration State Link, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/State-Links.asp
x?cat=Constitutional%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Provisions (last visited 
September 2, 2017).  
 264. Research turned up nothing that provides that “open” mandates full 
disclosure of a party’s full name. 
 265. See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 13; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 6; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 
10; DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9; KY. CONST. § 14; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22; MISS. CONST. art. 
III, § 24,; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 15; PA. CONST. art. I,  11; 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 19; TEX. CONST, art. I, § 13;  UTAH 
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that it is tied to the concept of “a right to a remedy,” not public 
access to courtrooms.266 Furthermore, “courts have never 
undertaken the task of discovering from where the provision came, 
or attempted to discern its original intent.”267 Some scholars go so 
far as to opine that this language was added as a carryover from 
language contained in the Magna Carta, without any real intent and 
purpose.268   
One scholar has surmised that “[t]he provision’s key phrases, 
promoting openness in judicial proceedings and ensuring every 
person ‘remedy by due course of law,’ disclose its true meaning as a 
guarantee of freedom of the judiciary from corrupt influence and 
improper meddling.”269 He opined that “[b]elieving in the necessity of 
an independent judiciary, the earliest state constitutions 
incorporated this provision to ensure that justice would not be 
compromised as it had been in the past.”270 Another scholar 
concluded that: 
 
the early purpose of the open courts provision was to ensure 
that all persons would have access to justice through the 
courts. . . . [T]he various states’ interpretations of the 
provision are inconsistent and . . . the jurisprudential 
significance of the provision varies dramatically from state to 
state. In some states, it is second only to the due process 
clause in importance; while in other states, it is little more 
than an interesting historical relic.271 
 
                                                                                                                    
 
COSNT. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 4; WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 8, all available at 
http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Judicial-Officers/Judicial-Administration/State-
Links.aspx?cat=Constitutional%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Provisions. 
 266. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hoffman, Questions Before Answers: The Ongoing 
Search to Understand the Origins of the Open Courts Clause, 32 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 
1005, 1006 n.5 (2001); William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee's Open Courts 
Clause: A Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee 
Constitution, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 333, 419 (1997); David Schuman, Oregon's Remedy 
Guarantee: Article I, Section 10 of the Oregon Constitution, 65 OR. L. REV. 35, 42 
(1986). 
 267. Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1282.  
 268. See Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1284; Hoffman, supra note 266, at 1006; 
Schuman, supra note 266, at 39. 
 269. Hoffman, supra note 259, at 1288. 
 270. Id. at 1318. 
 271. Koch, Jr., supra note 266, at 341. 
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Thus, a fair interpretation of the clause is that it does not refer 
to third parties’ rights to enter the courtroom.272 For example, 
although article I, § 13 of the Texas Constitution states that “[a]ll 
courts shall be open,”273 the Supreme Court of Texas has noted that 
that section  “includes at least three separate constitutional 
guarantees: (1) courts must actually be operating and available; (2) 
the Legislature cannot impede access to the courts through 
unreasonable financial barriers; and (3) meaningful remedies must 
be afforded.”274 Yet another theory is that the clause is one that 
refers to the right to a remedy.275   
                                                                                                                    
 
 272. See e.g., State v. Porter Superior Court, 412 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ind. 1980); 
Dodd v. Reese, 24 N.E.2d 995 (Ind. 1940); (“[T]he requirement of Art. I, § 12, that the 
courts be open may refer to being open to the injured for legal redress . . . , and not to 
openness in the sense of being open to observation by the public and press.”) (citing 
Gallup v. Schmidt, 56 N.E. 443 (Ind. 1900)); Goodrum v. Asplundth Tree Expert Co., 
824 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Mo. 1992) (‘“Art. I §14 does not create rights, but is meant to protect 
the enforcement of rights already acknowledged by law.  The right of access means 
simply the right to pursue in the courts the causes of action substantive law 
recognizes.’”) (quoting Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Services, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 
510 (Mo. 1991)); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P. 2d 488 (Mont. 1989) (“[Article of 
Constitution governing access to court and guaranteeing remedy] guarantees only 
right of access to courts to seek remedy recognized by common-law or statutory 
authority”); Mehdipour v. Wise, 65 P.3d 271, 275 (Okla. 2003) (“It is always 
important to recognize that the right to reasonable access to the courts is not the 
same thing as having a right to appear personally in court to participate in a lawsuit 
which has been filed there.”);  Kyllo v. Panzer, 535 N.W.2d 896, 901 (S.D. 2012) (“[We 
have] interpreted the open courts provision as a guarantee that for such wrongs as 
are recognized by the laws of the land the courts shall be open and afford a remedy.”) 
(quoting  Simons v. Kidd, 38 N.W.2d 883, 886 (S.D. 1949)) (internal citations 
omitted); Puttuck v. Gendron, 199 P.3d 971, 978 (Utah App. 2008) (“[T]he open 
courts provision was intended to place ‘a limitation upon the [l]egislature to prevent 
that branch of the state government from closing the doors of the courts against any 
person who has a legal right which is enforceable in accordance with some known 
remedy.’”) (quoting Brown v. Wightman, 151 P. 366, 366-67 (Utah 1915)); see also 
Louis F. Hubener, Rights of Privacy in Open Courts – Do They Exist? 2 EMERGING 
ISSUES ST. Const. L. 189, 192 (1989) (“These provisions originated, however, as 
guarantees of legal remedies, not to ensure that courts would be open for 
spectators”). But see KFGO Radio Inc., v. Rothe, 298 N.W.2d. 505, 511 (N.D. 1980) 
(“[T]he provision in Article I, §22 of the Constitution of North Dakota which states 
that ‘all courts shall be open’ stands for the proposition that officers of the courts, 
along with jurors, witnesses, litigants, and the general public have the right of 
admission to court proceedings.”). 
 273. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. 
 274. Trinity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, 889 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. 1994) 
(citing Tex. Ass’n of Business v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 448 (Tex. 
1993). 
 275. See Schuman, supra note 266, at 35–36.   
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Given the uncertainty regarding the meaning of the open court 
ideal, and the Supreme Court’s implicit acceptance of the practice of 
pseudonymous plaintiffs, my assertion is straightforward: the notion 
of open courts should not be an impediment to the use of 
pseudonyms by certain rightsholders. Using a pseudonym does not 
impact societal access to the workings of the judiciary. The public 
does not know the identity of most plaintiffs in class action lawsuits, 
yet these cases have provided invaluable information regarding 
various legal issues. Indeed, in the overwhelming number of cases it 
is not the plaintiff’s name that is relevant to the public,276 but rather 
the specifics about the cause of action. I suggest that in most cases 
there is no material difference to the public if the plaintiff is 
revealed to be Bob and not John. The important public aspect of 
most cases concerns the issues involved, not the specific party 
raising the issues. “Case law indicates that any risk . . . of allowing a 
plaintiff to proceed anonymously is minimized when the ‘issues 
raised are purely legal and do not depend on identifying the specific 
parties.’”277 The public has little legitimate interest in knowing the 
identity of a party suing it if that party’s identity has little or no 
bearing on the case itself.278 Indeed, one court noted that “[i]f a 
plaintiff is granted leave to proceed using a fictitious name, the 
public is not denied its right to attend the proceedings or inspect the 
orders or opinions of the court on the underlying constitutional 
issue.”279   
 
                                                                                                                    
 
 276. The plaintiff’s identity, however, might be particularly important to the 
defendant. I propose a solution to this dichotomy of interests in my 
recommendations, Part IV infra.  
 277. Doe 1 v. Merten, 219 F.R.D. 387, 394 n. 22 (E.D. Va. 2004) (citing Doe v. 
Alaska, No. 96-35873, 1997 WL 547941, at *1 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Doe v. 
Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 731 (W.D. Va. 2012).  But see Doe v. 
Spearmint Rhino, No. CV 08-4038 ABC, 2009 WL 250054, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2009) 
(‘Identifying the parties to the proceeding is an important dimension of publicness. 
The people have a right to know who is using their courts.”) (citing United States v. 
Stoterau, 524 F.3d 988, 1012 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 278. See, e.g., Freedom From Religion Found. v. New Kensington-Arnold Sch. 
Dist., No. 2:12-cv-1319, 2012 WL 6629643, *3 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (stating in a case in 
which the plaintiffs sought a declaration that a monument of the Ten 
Commandments at the local high school was unconstitutional that “the issue in this 
case does not turn on the identity of the [p]laintiffs”). 
 279. Doe v. Pittsylvania Cty., 844 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (citing Doe v. Barrow Co., 
219 F.R.D. 189, 193 (N.D. Ga. 2003)). 
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C.  A Misplaced Aversion to the Concept of Anonymity. 
 
Those who eschew the concept of anonymity need only be 
reminded of its importance in United States legal history. “Between 
1789 and 1809, six presidents, fifteen cabinet members, twenty 
senators, and thirty-four congressmen published anonymous 
political writings or used pen names.”280 The Federalist Papers and 
their rebuttal were authored under a pseudonym.281 In 1995, the 
Supreme Court recognized that “[a]nonymity is a shield from the 
tyranny of the majority. . . . It thus exemplifies the purpose behind 
the Bill of Rights and of the First Amendment in particular: to 
protect unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an 
intolerant society.”282 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that 
anonymous speech is afforded the same Constitutional first 
amendment rights as speech of which the author is known.283 
Applying to postings on the internet the Supreme Court’s support of 
the role that anonymity plays in protecting one’s rights, the Ninth 
Circuit stated, “[a]s with other forms of expression, the ability to 
speak anonymously on the Internet promotes the robust exchange of 
ideas and allows individuals to express themselves freely without 
‘fear of economic or official retaliation . . . [or] concern about social 
ostracism.’”284 Several district courts have observed that “[t]he free 
exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the 
ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously.”285 State 
courts have also highlighted the importance of anonymous internet 
speech.286   
 
                                                                                                                    
 
 280. SOLOVE, supra note 24, at 139–40. 
 281. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995); 
Primary Documents in American History: The Federalist Papers, WEB GUIDES, 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/federalist.html (last visited Sept. 3, 
2017). 
 282. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343. 
 283. Id.    
 284. In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348).  
 285. In re Rule 45 Subpoena Issued to Cablevision Sys. Corp. Regarding IP 
Address 69.120.35.31, No. 08MC347 ARR MDG, 2010 WL 1686811, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. 
2010) (quoting Doe v. 2TheMart.Com Inc. 140 F.Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 
2001)). 
 286. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Klehr Harrison Harvey 
Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., No. 0425 MARCH TERM 2004, 2006 WL 
37020, at *3 (Pa. C. P. 2006). 
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D.  Ignorance of the Costs of Denying Certain Plaintiffs the Right to 
Proceed Using a Pseudonym. 
 
1.  Lack of Participation in the Judicial Process 
 
Danielle Citron has contended that cyber harassment can raise 
the price too high for vulnerable groups to remain online.287 These 
costs can include, inter alia, physical threats, employment-
interfering posts, and invasion of privacy.288 The result, according to 
Citron, is that vulnerable people are forced offline, “preventing them 
from enjoying the economic and social opportunities that social 
networking sites, blogs, . . . and other platforms provide.”289 Citron 
opined that silencing these bloggers impoverishes societal dialogue 
as a whole.290 She warned that cyber harassment “depriv[es] 
vulnerable individuals of their equal right to participate in social, 
economic, and political life.”291  
A recent example of Citron’s assertion involves Chelsea Cain, the 
author of a female heroine based comic series for Marvel. Cain quit 
Twitter after receiving a surge of misogynistic tweets. She stated, “I 
left Twitter because of the ordinary daily abuse that I decided I 
didn’t want to live with anymore. . . . That’s the power we have, 
right? . . . If a stranger yells at you on the street? You walk away.”292 
In contrast, “walking away” from bringing a lawsuit as a result 
of being denied the ability to do so pseudonymously results in a loss 
of power both to vulnerable rightsholders and to the public. On a 
foundational level, some rightsholders will lose their access to justice 
due to their determination that the cost of participation in the 
system—the risk and ramifications of public shaming—is too high. 
This is a harm even if their claims are not meritorious because these 
rightsholders will feel disenfranchised from the judicial process. 
Other rightsholders dissuaded from bringing their lawsuits will lose 
the opportunity to receive a settlement or litigated-for judgment. 
The public loses as well when certain rightsholders do not proceed 
with their actions. Societal faith in the judicial system can be lost 
                                                                                                                    
 
 287. Citron, supra note 141, at 68–69.  
 288. Id. at 69. 
 289. Id. at 68–69.  
 290. Id. at 85.  
 291. Id. at 89. 
 292. Ryan Grenoble, Feminist Comic Book Author Quits Twitter Amid Storm Of 
Abusive Tweets, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 28, 2016, 03:12 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/entry/chelsea-cain-mockingbird-feminist-comics-twitter_us_ 
58136044e4b0990edc307fc1 [https://perma.cc/V8LA-HLMJ]. 
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because potential defendants will continue to act improperly since 
the threat of a lawsuit, normally a deterrent to bad behavior, will be 
absent.   
 
2.  Loss Of Valuable Precedent 
 
In instances where rightsholders choose to refain from 
commencing litigation rather than risk being publicly shamed, 
valuable precedent is potentially lost. Take, for example, the 
shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary. As I noted earlier, a lawyer 
sued the Connecticut Department of Education on behalf of a first-
grader who suffered emotional trauma as a result of the incident.293 
However, because of harsh backlash on social media, he was forced 
to withdraw the case.294 The public shaming in that case resulted in 
a loss of what could have been invaluable precedent—precedent that 
could have changed the legal landscape involving school shootings. 
In other words, had the lawsuit gone forward, we might have had a 
better understanding of the legal issues regarding school safety and 
gun violence in Connecticut.   
In similar litigation that did go forward, valuable precedent was 
created. Several families of those injured and killed in the 
Columbine school shooting sued the gunmen’s parents and those 
who supplied the teens with the weapons they used to commit the 
massacre.295 Although the lawsuits settled before verdict, the 
amounts are indicative of the role the court considers parental and 
third-party responsibility plays in such tragedies.296  In the wake of 
the killings at Virginia Tech, parents of two of the deceased students 
sued the University, alleging that the University was negligent for 
failing to warn students of the presence of a gunman on campus.297 
                                                                                                                    
 
 293. See discussion supra Part I.B.   
 294. Id. 
 295. Michael Janofsky, $2.53 Million Deal Ends Some Columbine Lawsuits, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/20/us/2.53-million-deal-ends-
some-columbine-lawsuits.html. 
 296. Id. Much legal scholarship has focused on the lack of precedential value 
when a lawsuit results in settlement. See, e.g., Owen Fiss &Leandra Lederman, 
Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-party Involvement 
in Settlements? 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221, (1999).  This is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
 297. See Peterson v. Thyden, No. CL 2009–5670, 2009 WL 1026043 (Va. Cir. Ct. 
April 16, 2009); see also Steve Szkotak, Jury Finds Virginia Tech Liable in Campus 
Shooting, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (March 14, 2012), http://www.csmonitor. 
com/USA/Latest-News-Wires/2012/0314/Jury-finds-Virginia-Tech-liable-in-campus-
shooting. 
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After trial, the jury awarded each of the two plaintiffs $4,000,000.298 
The case made its way up to the Supreme Court of Virginia, where 
the lower court’s findings were reversed. The Court held that “the 
facts in this case do not give rise to a duty for the Commonwealth to 
warn students of the potential for third party criminal acts.”299 In 
less than three years since that decision was published, courts in 
Virginia utilized its precedent in deciding six cases in that state.300   
More recently, in 2012, high school student T.J. Lane entered the 
Chardon High School cafeteria in Ohio with a .22 caliber semi-
automatic handgun and shot six students.301 Relatives of some of the 
students who were killed sued, inter alia, the school board, the 
school district, and several school employees, alleging, inter alia, 
wrongful death and recklessness.302 The defendants moved for 
judgment on the pleadings, alleging that they were immune because 
they were acting in their official capacity as employees of a political 
subdivision.303 The trial court disagreed, denying the defendants’ 
motion, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio affirmed the trial court’s 
ruling.304 While that precedent has to date not been utilized (and 
hopefully will never need to be), the litigation in that case let to a 
better understanding of the responsibility of certain parties in Ohio 
regarding school safety.305 The importance of the precedential value 
of these cases cannot be overstated as they contribute to our 
collective jurisprudence regarding school shootings and gun safety.   
 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Given that the Supreme Court has tacitly approved the use of 
pseudonymous plaintiffs,306 I recommend that the Court exercise its 
supervisory authority over the federal courts307 and promulgate 
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rules of civil procedure establishing standards and procedures for 
rightsholders seeking to proceed pseudonymously. While the 
specifics of these procedures are beyond the scope of this paper, I 
advance that it is imperative that the potential for public shaming 
as a result of bringing a lawsuit—and the deterrent effect that such 
shaming can have—be a central consideration when evaluating 
whether to permit a rightsholder to litigate pseudonymously.308 
Under my proposal, the rightsholder would have to demonstrate that 
(i) circumstances exist such that proceeding under a pseudonym is 
necessary to avoid the “likelihood of susceptibility to public shaming” 
as a result of bringing the lawsuit; and (ii) the rightsholder would be 
reasonably deterred from proceeding, out of concern for the public 
shaming. The burden would then shift to the defendant to show how 
permitting the rightsholder to proceed under a pseudonym would be 
prejudicial to the defense of the case. The plaintiff’s anonymity 
would extend only to court filings and any other documents that 
would be released to the public.309 In other words, the defendant 
would have the same information about the plaintiff had the 
plaintiff filed the case under her own name. The public would also be 
welcome to protest the plaintiff’s anonymity, demonstrating why the 
plaintiff’s specific identity would be necessary for a public 
understanding of the legal issues involved in the case.   
The court would be free to modify this ruling at any point in the 
proceeding should the circumstances change. The defendant would 
be permitted to file motions stating objections to the plaintiff’s use of 
a pseudonym as the case progresses, and the court could even review 
the issue sua sponte. However, once the rightsholder demonstrated a 
likelihood of public shaming as a result of bringing the action—
shaming that would reasonably deter her from going forward—the 
criteria for re-evaluation would be limited to (i) whether the public’s 
lack of knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity impairs the defendant’s 
ability to defend the case, or (ii) whether the public’s lack of 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s identity impairs the public’s ability to 
understand the legal issues in the case. If it is shown that there is no 
longer a threat to the plaintiff of being publicly shamed, or any such 
threat should not reasonably deter the plaintiff from proceeding, 
then anonymity would no longer be required. Protections against the 
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defendant’s release of the plaintiff’s identity should be contained in a 
court order against disclosure. This order would in essence be no 
different than the sorts of protective orders that courts routinely 
issue during the course of litigation.   
 
A proposed order could be fashioned as follows: 
 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of plaintiff’s Motion for Permission to 
Proceed in Pseudonym and for Protective Order, and defendant’s 
response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is 
GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that: 
1. Plaintiff is allowed to proceed in pseudonym and the docket 
shall continue to reflect plaintiff’s name as Jane Doe. 
2. Plaintiff will be referred to as Jane Doe in all depositions, 
pleadings and other documents related to this litigation, and the 
plaintiff shall be allowed to endorse documents related to this 
litigation using the pseudonym, Jane Doe. 
3. The identity of Jane Doe and her address shall be available 
to the attorneys of record and in-house counsel for the defendants, 
who shall not disclose or permit disclosure thereof, except to the 
following persons: 
a) Their law partners, associates and persons employed in 
the law offices of such attorneys, and other in-house counsel; 
b) The employees of defendant who have knowledge of the 
facts alleged in the Amended Complaint; 
c) Bona fide outside experts and their employees, not on the 
staff of any party, consulted by such attorneys in the 
prosecution or defense of the claims herein; 
d) A person whose deposition is to be taken in this action, 
but only to the extent necessary for the deposition; and 
e) Any person who potentially possesses information that is 
relevant to plaintiff’s claims or defendant’s defense. 
4. Each person to whom the identity of Jane Doe is to be 
disclosed pursuant to this Order, shall agree in advance: 
a) That he or she will not disclose the identity of Jane Doe 
to any person not entitled to know her identity under this 
Order; and 
b) That he or she will not use the identity of Jane Doe 
except in connection with the prosecution or defense of the 
claims herein. 
5. In the event defendant believes it is necessary in the defense 
of the claims herein for it to disclose the identity of Jane Doe to 
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persons other than those specified in this Order, defendant shall 
communicate with plaintiff’s counsel and if agreement cannot be 
reached in writing, the matter shall be determined by the Court. 
6. Attendance at any part of any deposition of which the 
identity of Jane Doe is disclosed shall be limited to those to whom 
disclosure of such information can be made pursuant to this Order, 
and only after they have complied with the terms of this Order. 
7. In all proceedings held before this Court, including trial, all 
counsel, witnesses and court personnel present shall refer to plaintiff 
by her pseudonym, Jane Doe. 
8. In all proceedings held before this Court, including trial, 
plaintiff’s photograph shall not be taken by members of the media 
and plaintiff’s picture shall not be drawn by the courtroom artists. 
9. The terms of this Order shall remain in effect until further 
Order of this Court. 
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.310 
 
Using the Jessica Ahlquist case311 as an example, the process 
would work as follows: 
Ahlquist would draft and file her complaint against the school 
district, keeping all of the original facts but substituting “Jane Doe” 
for her name as the plaintiff. She would then move the court for 
permission to proceed under the pseudonym. Ahlquist would have to 
demonstrate that she reasonably would be deterred from going 
forward with her lawsuit if the court were to deny her motion. In so 
doing she could point to previous examples of instances where 
atheists bringing actions under the Equal Protection Clause were 
publicly shamed. Ahlquist could emphasize any noteworthy 
vulnerabilities particular to her—her age, for example.   
In order to successfully object to Ahlquist’s use of a pseudonym, 
the defendant would be required to explain why its defense would be 
jeopardized by permitting Ahlquist to be anonymous. First, the court 
would determine whether Ahlquist’s allegation that she would be 
deterred from proceeding if denied the ability to do so anonymously 
was reasonable. Next, the court would establish if the defendant 
would be unable to mount a complete defense to Ahlquist’s 
allegations if she were permitted to proceed anonymously (but 
known to the defendant).  Assuming that the court determined that 
Ahlquist could go forward using the pseudonym, the case would 
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remain docketed with the plaintiff’s name as “Jane Doe.” The public 
would have full access to “Jane Doe’s” complaint. It would be free to 
petition the court for release of Jane Doe’s true name. In order to be 
successful, the public would need to convince the court that there 
was something about the plaintiff’s specific identity that was 
necessary for an understanding and assessment of the legal issues 
involved in the case. If the case remained docketed as “Jane Doe,” 
the public would still be free to voice its criticism of the plaintiff’s 
Equal Protection claim. However, rather than attack Ahlquist 
personally—as happened in her case—the public would express its 
disdain for her position as a plaintiff. 
Using plaintiff pseudonymity to combat public shaming is not 
without its flaws. From the parties’ perspective, proceeding 
anonymously could inadvertently create a “Streisand effect,” 
drawing unwanted attention to the case. There would also be added 
expenses to the plaintiff related to the motion seeking pseudonymity. 
From the courts’ perspective, the process of assessing a request for 
plaintiff anonymity would increase the courts’ workload and could 
create further inefficiencies in the already overburdened judicial 
system. For example, it could be difficult for a court to determine 
what constitutes a reasonable fear of being publicly shamed that 
would deter a rightsholder from coming forward. And even after 
making such a determination, fashioning a suitable protective order 
in a particular case might be exceptionally challenging. Many cases 
dealing with anonymous plaintiffs are not appealed, so there likely 
will not be much precedent to offer guidance. And, while it might be 
simple to redact the plaintiff’s name from relevant documents, 
redacting identifying information contained therein could be 
anything but straightforward. Indeed, the process simply might not 
work. For example, in the case of Prestigious Pets,312 it would be 
difficult to shield the plaintiff’s identity when the Yelp posting is 
available for public view. 
From the perspective of the public, there is a risk that permitting 
certain plaintiffs to proceed anonymously will erode confidence in 
the judicial system. Society might be wary of plaintiffs who seek to 
conceal their identity, believing that their anonymity influenced the 
decision.313 Furthermore, there could be situations where society 
would benefit from public shaming as a deterrent to litigation. The 
Prestigious Pets314 case might be an example where it would be 
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favorable to deter the company’s speech-stifling lawsuit and spare 
the Yelp reviewer the expsense of defending herself in costly 
litigation. 
Nonetheless, in the right circumstances, plaintiff pseudonymity 
could neutralize the dangers of public shaming, while maintaining 
society’s access to the judicial process and ability to express distain 




Social media and the internet ensure that widespread public 
shaming is here to stay. While several scholars have written about 
various remedies for those who have been harmed by such 
shaming,315 my focus is on preventing the shaming before it occurs. 
Specifically, my concern is with rightsholders whose vulnerability to 
shaming impacts their ability to seek justice. When a lawsuit is 
likely to be met with public shaming that reasonably would deter a 
rightsholder from proceeding, I propose that that rightsholder be 
permitted to litigate pseudonymously. Under the right 
circumstances, plaintiff pseudonymity could neutralize the dangers 
of public shaming, while maintaining society’s ability to access the 
judicial process, enable individual rightsholders to obtain justice, 
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